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ABSTRACT
Optimal Channel-Switching Strategies in Multi-channel Wireless Networks
by
Qingsi Wang
Chair: Professor Mingyan Liu
The dual nature of scarcity and under-utilization of spectrum resources, as well as
recent advances in software-defined radio, led to extensive study on the design of
transceivers that are capable of opportunistic channel access. By allowing users to
dynamically select which channel(s) to use for transmission, the overall throughput
performance and the spectrum utilization of the system can in general be improved,
compared to one with a single channel or more static channel allocations. The rea-
son for such improvement lies in the exploitation of the underlying temporal, spa-
tial, spectral and congestion diversity. In this dissertation, we focus on the channel-
switching/hopping decision of a (group of) legitimate user(s) in a multi-channel wire-
less communication system, and study three closely related problems: 1) a jamming
defense problem against a no-regret learning attacker, 2) a jamming defense problem
with minimax (worst-case) optimal channel-switching strategies, and 3) the through-
put optimal strategies for a group of competing users in IEEE 802.11-like medium
access schemes.
For the first problem we study the interaction between a user and an attacker
from a learning perspective, where an online learner naturally adapts to the available
x
information on the adversarial environment over time, and evolves its strategy with
certain payoff guarantee. We show how the user can counter a strong learning at-
tacker with knowledge on its learning rationale, and how the learning technique can
itself be considered as a countermeasure with no such prior information. We further
consider in the second problem the worst-case optimal strategy for the user without
prior information on the attacking pattern, except that the attacker is subject to a
resource constraint, which models its energy consumption and replenishment process.
We provide explicit characterization for the optimal strategies and show the most
damaging attacker, interestingly, behaves randomly in an i.i.d. fashion. In the last
problem, we consider a group of competing users in a non-adversarial setting. We
place the interaction among users in the context of IEEE 802.11-like medium access
schemes, and derive decentralized channel allocation for overall throughput improve-
ment. We show the typically rule-of-thumb load balancing principle in spectrum
resource sharing can be indeed throughput optimal.
xi
CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Overview
Advances in software-defined radio in recent years have motivated numerous stud-
ies on building agile, channel-aware transceivers that are capable of sensing instan-
taneous channel quality [1, 2, 3]. With this opportunity comes the challenge of mak-
ing effective opportunistic channel access and transmission scheduling decisions, as
well as designing supporting system architectures. In this research, we focus on the
channel-hopping decision of a (group of) legitimate user(s) in multi-channel wireless
communication systems. By allowing users to dynamically select which channel to
use for transmission, we aim to improve the system performance (e.g., throughput)
compared to a system with a single channel or more static channel allocations, lever-
aging the potential temporal, spatial, spectral and congestion diversity. In particular,
stemming from the assumption on motivating incentives and performance criteria of
channel switching, we study three closely related problems: 1) a jamming defense
problem against a no-regret learning attacker, 2) a jamming defense problem with
minimax (worst-case) optimal channel-switching strategies, and 3) the throughput
optimal strategies for a group of competing users in IEEE 802.11-like medium access
schemes.
Existing work on jamming defense problems typically either assumes stationary or
1
heuristic behavior of one side and examines countermeasures of the other, or assumes
both sides to be strategic which leads to a game theoretical framework. Results from
the former often lack robustness against changes in the adversarial behavior, while
those from the latter may be difficult to justify due to the implied full information (ei-
ther as realizations or as distributions) and rationality, both of which may be limited
in practice. In the first jamming defense problem of this research, we take a differ-
ent approach by assuming an intelligent attacker that is adaptive to the information
available to it and is capable of learning over time with performance guarantee via
repeated interaction. In the second problem, we revisit the jamming defense assum-
ing an attacker that is subject to a resource (e.g. power) constraint with possibly
a replenishment process, and meanwhile, no prior statistical information on the at-
tacking pattern is known to the user. We consider the minimax optimal strategy of
the user in a multi-stage interaction, i.e., the worst-case optimality result. In most
commercial applications, the interference to a user is not from a malicious attacker
but rather competing legitimate users. Our last problem then considers the interac-
tion among the group of users and we seek efficient decentralized channel allocation
for overall throughput enhancement of the widely deployed IEEE 802.11-like medium
access schemes.
1.2 Literature Review
In this section, we provide a brief review of existing work related to our problem
formulation and solution techniques. The first two problems in our study concern
the channel-switching decision of a legitimate user in the presence of jamming at-
tacks. In the first problem, we model the adaptive reasoning and decision-making of
the jammer using no-regret online learning algorithms, which provides considerable
performance guarantee for the attacker. We then consider in the second problem
a more vicious attacker, which is a strict competitor in a zero-sum sense in terms
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of payoffs of the competing user and attacker, and we develop a worst-case optimal
learning technique as the solution for the user. Our last problem will be placed in the
context of medium access in multi-channel IEEE 802.11 WLANs, and we examine
the decentralized channel-switching decisions in a population of users for throughput
improvement. We hence in the following summarize literature related to jamming
defense problems, online learning theory and modeling of throughput performance in
IEEE 802.11 WLANs.
Jamming defense. The jamming defense problem can be considered in a general
context as an instance of the pursuit-evasion problem, and the decision-making of both
sides have been studied with extensive efforts. A big part of the literature considers
stationary or heuristic behavior of one side and examines corresponding countermea-
sures of the other. Examples include [4, 5, 6, 7] and the references therein, that
assume a stationary target (the evader) hiding in any of a set of locations with known
prior probabilities. Variants of this model include, e.g., [8] that uses a random prior
probability of hiding in a given location, and [9] where the detection probability is
random with known distribution. Search problems with a moving evader have also
been extensively studied. However, the evasion is typically either independent of the
pursuer’s activity, or heuristically given without clearly defined rationale or perfor-
mance guarantee, see e.g., [10], where the evader’s motion is given by a discrete-time
Markov chain independent of the pursuer’s activity, and [11] for a similar, continuous-
time formulation. For applied studies in jamming and defense, see e.g., [12, 13] for a
collection of specific attack mechanisms and anti-jamming measures. Examples also
include using stronger error detection, correction, and spreading codes at the physical
layer [14, 15, 16, 17], exploring the vulnerability in the rate adaptation mechanism
of IEEE 802.11 [18], and multi-channel jamming using a single cognitive ratio [19].
Interestingly, jamming can also be used by legitimate users to achieve physical layer
security in the presence of an eavesdropper, see e.g., [20, 21, 22].
The interacting attacker and defender are also often assumed to be strategic, lead-
ing to a game theoretical framework. A typical method is to use differential games
[23] to capture the continuous evolution; in fact, the pursuit-evasion problem bears
the genesis of differential games. See also [24, 25, 26] for texts and examples of differ-
ential games and their application in the pursuit-evasion problem. For the particular
jamming defense problem, the two-player interaction can be in terms of respective
power control or channel selection strategies. Examples include a non-zero-sum game
formulation when transmission costs are incurred to both the jammer and the user
[27], a random access game [28], a differential game between a mobile jammer and
mobile users [29], a Stackelberg game [30], and a zero-sum game framework [31].
Typically the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies is investigated and the equilib-
rium strategies are identified if they exist under the respective game formulation. We
note that existing results in general focus on analyzing the one-stage game, while the
multi-stage or the repeated case is often elusive in analysis and replaced with various
approximated problems, e.g. [32].
Online learning. Sequential decision-making in an environment, which gener-
ates as feedback reward or penalty with uncertain, models the basic feature of a
variety of situations in everyday life and engineering applications. Online learning
concerns the development of an adaptive and systematic decision procedure (or an
algorithm), given past decisions and feedbacks, so as to optimize the utility of the
learner. In this research, we mainly utilize formulation and results from the online
learning theory in the so-called “adversarial setting”, which assumes no prior statis-
tical knowledge on the environment (See [33] for a recent text). Given the unknown
but non-stochastic nature of the environment, the performance of a learning algo-
rithm is typically evaluated using the notion of regret, defined as the difference in
reward or loss obtained between a suitably defined strategy in hindsight and that ac-
cumulated by the algorithm over time. There have been abundant results in realizing
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(asymptotic) no-regret learning algorithms that yield (order-optimal) regret sublinear
in time (see [34, 35, 36, 37] as examples for a line of continuing efforts, see [38] for an
in-depth survey and references therein). In the context of jamming defense problem,
the no-regret performance guarantee translates into sublinear “missing” of effective
jamming or interference-free transmission opportunities, compared to a certain class
of strategies in hindsight.
The rationale behind online learning differs from the strategic reasoning behind
game-theoretical analysis, in that typically neither the learner nor the environment
(possibly a multitude of other learner with conflicting interest) has unbounded ratio-
nality. However, when all interacting parties adopt learning techniques, the asymp-
totic interplay may exhibit well-defined equilibria, that are closely related to game-
theoretical solution concepts. thus providing an alternative interpretation of game
theoretical results. In fact, the generic characterization on the learning limit using
no-regret algorithms would be the convergence to the set of (coarse) correlated equi-
libria [39] [40], which is however usually weak in most applications given a broad set
of equilibrium points. As to the convergence of learning to Nash Equilibrium (NE),
it has been shown no-regret dynamics may not converge to NE in general games [41],
with however a few affirmative results in special cases [42, 43].
IEEE 802.11 DCF. The medium access control in IEEE 802.11-based WLANs uti-
lizes the standardized Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) [44], a contention-
based MAC protocol. DCF has been very extensively studied in the literature, ranging
from throughput performance in the saturated regime [45, 46] and the non-saturated
regime [47, 48], to its rate region [49, 50], to channel assignment in multi-channel
WLANs [51, 52], to name a few. We consider decentralized channel-switching strate-
gies for a group of contending users in a multi-channel system under DCF, and to
evaluate the throughput performance of a given scheme for a variety of network traffic
conditions, we use the notion of its stability region, which is given as the set of all
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sustainable combinations of incoming traffic loads at users. To the best of our knowl-
edge, however, none has studied multi-channel WLANs in the context of stability
region. Works most relevant to ours include ones on the stability region of slotted
Aloha (e.g., [53]) and the rate region of 802.11 DCF [49, 50].
1.3 Organization and Main Contributions
The first two chapters focus on the optimal channel switching as jamming defense.
With respect to different set of assumptions on the adversarial behavior of the attacker
and optimality criteria, we consider two problems, respectively.
Chapter II: Optimal Channel Switching as Jamming Defense - Part I:
Against a No-Regret Learning Attacker [54, 55]
Assuming an online learning attacker, we investigate two cases depending on the
knowledge of the user. In the first case we assume the user is aware of the type of
learning algorithm used by the attacker, while in the second case it does not have
such information and thus must try to learn. We show that the optimal policies in
the first case have a greedy nature. This result is then used to assess the performance
of the learning algorithms that both sides employ in the second case, which is shown
to be mutually optimal and there is no loss for either side compared to the case when
the user knows perfectly the adaptive pattern used by the adversary and responses
optimally. Based on the above result, we also show that if in addition to the channel-
switching decisions the user also needs to perform transmission power control, there is
one-way decoupling of the joint control of channel selection and power control. That
is, the power control can be independent from the channel selection.
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Chapter III: Optimal Channel Switching as Jamming Defense - Part II:
Against a Resource-Replenishing Attacker with Minimax Optimality [56]
The worst-case optimality criterion leads to a repeated zero-sum game theoretical
framework as our main solution technique; however, this framework does not origi-
nate from the assumption on the rationality of the jammer or its motivating payoff,
but rather the learner’s (user’s) objective of optimizing achievable payoff unilaterally.
Interestingly, we show that the most damaging attacker for the user can be given as
an adversary who behaves in an i.i.d. manner in the multi-stage interaction. Based on
this, we provide the explicit characterization of the optimal channel-switching strate-
gies of the user, which is determined by the induced random walk of the adversarial
behavior. In addition to the jamming defense, our framework is also applicable to
other competitive game problems with finite action spaces.
The interference to a given user is usually a result of competition of other legiti-
mate users in commercial applications, instead of attack from a malicious entity. The
next two chapters then consider the problem of using channel switching as spectrum
resource sharing technique to mitigate interference among users and aim to promote
the throughput performance.
Chapter IV: Throughput Optimal Channel Switching in Random Access
- Part I: Intuition from Slotted Aloha
This chapter aims to provide theoretical preparation and insights, using slotted Aloha
and population game based simplification, for throughput optimal switching in IEEE
802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF), a widely deployed industrial stan-
dard medium access scheme that we study in Chapter V. The retrospective thinking
by replacing DCF by Aloha will continue to be vital for our analysis on the would-be
more involved DCF, and the intuition we shall conclude from this chapter will be
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shown to be consistent with our results for DCF.
Chapter V: Throughput Optimal Channel Switching in Random Access -
Part II: in IEEE 802.11 WLANs [57]
We observe that in a multi-channel wireless system, an opportunistic channel/spectrum
access scheme that solely focuses on channel quality sensing measured by received
SNR may induce users to use channels that, while providing better signals, are more
congested. Ultimately the notion of channel quality should include both the signal
quality and the level of congestion, and a good multi-channel access scheme should
take both into account in deciding which channel to use and when. Motivated by
this, we focus on the congestion aspect and examine what type of dynamic channel-
switching schemes may result in the best system throughput performance. This will
be evaluated using the notion of stability region of a scheme. This is because more
effective resource allocation and sharing can achieve a lower overall congestion level,
thus expanding the range of sustainable arrival rates and resulting in a larger stability
region. The scheme with the largest such region is commonly known as the through-
put optimal scheme. We derive the stability region of a multi-user multi-channel
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) system and determine the throughput opti-
mal channel-switching scheme within a certain class of schemes.
Chapter VI: Conclusion and Future Work
We summarize the main contributions of this dissertation and discuss the topics that
can be further pursued based on this research.
1.4 Notation Convention
For time-varying vector quantities, we typically reserve the subscript for its entry
indices, and use the superscript for time and other annotations. For example, we use
8
wt = (wt1, w
t
2, . . . , w
t
n) to denote a time-varying probability distribution vector over
the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, where wtk is the probability mass assigned to k. The convention
of using the superscript for time also applies to general quantities when there are
multiple indices pertaining to them except for a few instances. The main notation
used in each chapter is summarized in Appendix D.
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CHAPTER II
Optimal Channel Switching as Jamming Defense -
Part I: Against a No-Regret Learning Attacker
The vulnerabilities of wireless networks to security attacks given their broadcast
nature, and accordingly how to build resilient defenses, have been subjects of extensive
research. In the next two chapters, we utilize channel switching as a defense strategy
in multi-channel systems against jamming, which is a common type of Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks, and we investigate the optimal response from a legitimate user
to a jamming attacker in repeated interaction.
2.1 Problem Formulation
We shall formulate the problem in a general context of two-player repeated game1.
At time (or round) t, the row and the column player respectively choose distributions
(mixed strategies) wt and ut over their action spaces Aw and Au. We assume both the
action spaces Aw and Au are finite, and let m and n be their respective cardinality.
An action it ∈ Aw is then realized per wt independently for the row player, and so
does an action jt for the column player. The row player receives a payoff Mw(it, jt),
whereMw is a n×m payoff matrix for the row player, andMw(it, jt) denotes the (it, jt)
1We use the word game in a broad sense, without necessarily implying a game-theoretical strategic
analysis, unless otherwise stated.
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entry of Mw. Similarly, we denote by Mu the payoff matrix for the column player,
who observes a payoff Mu(it, jt). We denote by Itw (resp. Itu) the informational
state of the row player (resp. the column player) at time t, which consists of all
information or a sufficient statistic available to the player for decision making, and
by gtw (resp. g
t
u) the decision rule at time t, that is, w
t = gtw(Itw) and ut = gtu(Itu).
Let gw = (g
1
w, g
2
w, . . .) be the decision policy of the row player, which is the collection
of decision rules, and let the space of all policies be Gw. We similarly define the
decision policy and the policy space for the column player. The above setup can
accommodate a variety of two-player game problems depending on the structure of
the payoff matrices. For our application in jamming defense, we let the row player be
the user and the column player be the attacker (or the adversary interchangeably).
Also, Aw = Au = [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the index set of n channels of the
system. Without otherwise stated, we assume in this chapter:
Assumption II.1.
1. Mw(i, j) = 1i 6=j and Mu(i, j) = 1i=j, where 1{·} is the indicator function.
2. Both the user and the attacker have perfect observation and recall of the oppo-
nent’s and their own past actions.
The key question is given by how to model the interaction between the two players
and their behavior. In principle, each player can consider the optimization problems
maximize
gv∈Gv
E
{
T∑
t=1
(wt)⊤Mvu
t
}
, (2.1)
and
maximize
gv∈Gv
lim inf
T→∞
E
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
(wt)⊤Mvu
t
}
, (2.2)
where “v” denotes either “w” or “u”, the superscript ⊤ denotes the transpose, T is
a finite time horizon, and the expectation is taken with respect to any randomness
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involved in the evaluation of the total mean payoff. We note that while on one hand
these problems are always well-defined up to a subjective belief on the opponent’s
behavior, it can be difficult to be justify the optimization with respect to (w.r.t.) this
belief. In particular, when one has no prior knowledge on the opponent’s behavior,
this belief can be arbitrary. So the key boils down to the knowledge model on the
opponent’s behavior. Throughout this chapter, we assume:
Assumption II.2. The attacker has no information on the decision-making rationale
of the user. Then, instead of optimizing w.r.t. an arbitrary belief, the attacker is an
online learner and adopts a no-regret learning algorithm as its policy.
We thus investigate two cases depending on the knowledge of the user. In the
first case we assume the user is aware of the type of learning algorithm used by
the attacker, and the reasoning process of the user can then be given by the single-
sided optimization problems (2.1) and (2.2). This assumption on the knowledge is
unrealistically strong, but this case will serve as our baseline. With a bit abuse of
language, this case will be referred to as the known case. In the second case, or the
unknown case, it does not have such prior information, and there is hence a symmetry
in the amount of information for both sides. We then assume the user also behaves
as a learner, and we consider the asymptotic interaction.
2.2 Optimal Channel Switching against a No-Regret Learn-
ing Attacker
Online learning techniques typically provides certain performance guarantee; in
particular, we consider the so-called “no-regret” guarantee, which we elaborate as
follows. Given any sequence i[T ] := (i1, i2, . . . , iT ) of the row player’s realization of
actions over T in hindsight and the decision policy gu of the column player, define
the (external) regret Ru(T ; i[T ], gu) of the column player with respect to i[T ] and gu
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at the horizon T as
Ru(T ; i[T ]) = max
j∈[n]
T∑
t=1
e⊤itMuej − E
{
T∑
t=1
e⊤itMuu
t
}
,
where ek denotes the degenerate distribution with probability one on action k, and
the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness induced by gu. The regret
measures the gap between the payoff using a given policy and that using the best
static policy that always selects the same action. An online learning algorithm as a
policy for the column player is called “no-regret” if the regret is sublinear in time
or Ru(T ; i[T ]) = o(T ), that is, its average payoff is no worse than that of any static
policy for any realization of the opponent’s actions over time.
2.2.1 Against Adaptive Attack with Known Patterns
We consider in this chapter the baseline case, and we assume
Assumption II.3. The attacker uses the no-regret algorithm Hedge (or called Ex-
ponential Weights Algorithm) [35, 36], detailed in Table 2.1, which is known to user
along with the initial condition.
As to its no-regret guarantee, the performance of Hedge is formally characterized
by the following results from [36, 37].
Theorem II.4 ([36, 37]). If a = 1+
√
2 ln(n)/T , then Ru(T ; i[T ]) ≤
√
2T lnn for any
i[T ], where the expectation is w.r.t. the randomness in the actions taken by Hedge,
and the diminishing rate of the average regret over time is order-optimal.
Given the knowledge on the fact that the attacker is using Hedge and its initial
condition, and further due to the user’s perfect recall of past actions and observations,
it thus maintains the correct belief about the evolution of the adversary’s mixed
strategy ut determined by Hedge, and the information state of the user is simply
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Table 2.1: The Hedge algorithm.
Hedge
Parameter: A real number a > 1.
Initialization: Set G0k := 0 for all k ∈ [n].
Repeat for t = 1, 2, . . . , T
1. Choose channel jt according to the distribution ut = (ut1, u
t
2, . . . , u
t
n) on [n],
where
utj =
aG
t−1
j∑n
k=1 a
Gt−1
k
2. Observe the action it taken by the user, and obtain the (reward) vector
(xt1, x
t
2, . . . , x
t
n), where x
t
j = Mu(i
t, j).
3. Set Gtk = G
t−1
k + x
t
k for all k ∈ [n].
given by Itw = ut. In principle, the finite-horizon problem (2.1) can be solved using
standard dynamic programming. However, we will first try to argue intuitively what
the optimal policy should behave like. Since Hedge has a sublinear regret for the
attacker, if the users favors one channel, the attacker will eventually identify this most
user-active channel and jam it at a rate linear in T and miss it at a rate no more
than sublinear in T . It follows that the best strategy for the user is to transmit on
each channel evenly, either deterministically or stochastically. This intuition indeed
provides the precise solution to the infinite-horizon problem (2.2) as shown below.
Let r¯v(gw, gu, T ) = E
{
1
T
∑T
t=1(w
t)⊤Mvu
t
}
for any pair of policies gw and gu of the
user and the attacker, and let r¯v(gw, gu) = lim infT→∞ r¯v(gw, gu, T ). For any sequence
i[T ] of the user’s realization of actions over T , define the greedy policy by w
t = eit
where it ∈ argminj∈[n] utj, and we have the following result.
Theorem II.5. r¯w(gw, gu) ≤ n−1n for any policy gw when the attacker’s policy gu is
given by Hedge, and the greedy policy of the user achieves this upper bound.
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Proof. Note that
r¯w(gw, gu, T ) = E
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
(wt)⊤Mwu
t
}
= 1−E
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
(wt)⊤Muu
t
}
= 1−r¯u(gw, gu, T )
for any pair of gw and gu. Therefore, when gu is given by Hedge, using Theorem II.4
we have
r¯w(gw, gu) = 1− lim sup
T→∞
E
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
(wt)⊤Muu
t
}
≤ 1− lim sup
T→∞
E
{
1
T
(
max
j∈[n]
T∑
t=1
e⊤itMuej −
√
2T lnm
)}
= 1− lim sup
T→∞
E
{
1
T
max
j∈[n]
T∑
t=1
e⊤itMuej
}
≤ n− 1
n
,
where the expectation operator on the second line incorporates the randomness in the
realization of i[T ], and the last inequality is due to the fact that maxj∈[n]
∑T
t=1 e
⊤
itMuej ≥
T
n
for any i[T ].
Since minj∈[n] u
t
j ≤ 1n for any ut, we have (wt)⊤Mwut ≥ n−1n for any t using the
greedy policy, which implies that the greedy policy achieves the maximum average
payoff for the user.
Without loss of generality, we will assume under the greedy policy ties are broken
in favor of the lowest-indexed channel. Note that since the greedy policy always
selects the channel least likely to be jammed, it eventually (in finite time) leads to
equal weights over all channels even if the initial weights under Hedge is unequal.
Once the weights are equal, the user’s action is a simple round robin, using channel
in the order 1, 2, · · · , n. The above proof also suggests that any policy that results in
an equal frequency of presence on each channel has the same infinite-horizon average
payoff, thus asymptotically optimal. It should be noted that these equi-occupancy
polices are not necessarily optimal for the finite-horizon problem posed in (2.1). The
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greedy policy, however, is in fact also optimal over the finite horizon. Below we prove
this result for a two-channel scenario so as to avoid letting technicalities obscure the
main idea. The general case is stated in a theorem and the proof can be found in
Appendix A.
Lemma II.6. In a two-channel scenario, the optimal finite-horizon policy yields wt =
ek if u
t
k < 1/2 where k = 1, 2, and is indifferent between 1 and 2 when u
t
1 = u
t
2 = 1/2.
Proof. For any policy, let ∆(t) := |Gt1−Gt2|; this is the difference between the number
of times channel 1 and 2 have been used by the end of slot t. Thus |∆(t+1)−∆(t)| = 1
for all t. An example of ∆(t) up to T is shown in Figure 2.1: an edge connecting two
adjacent time points represents a particular channel selection it of the user, a down
edge indicating the selection of a currently under-utilized channel. Let r(t) = e⊤itMwu
t,
i.e., the mean payoff of choosing it at time t. We then have
r(t) =

a∆(t−1)
1+a∆(t−1)
, if ∆(t) < ∆(t− 1),
1
1+a∆(t−1)
, if ∆(t) > ∆(t− 1).
Suppose along any trajectory of ∆(t) there exists a point ∆(t) = d ≥ 2 such that
either of the following cases is true: (C1) d− 1 = ∆(t− 1) = ∆(t+1) < ∆(t), t < T ;
or (C2) ∆(T − 1) < ∆(T ). Then consider a change of policy by “folding” the point
at t down in (C1) and the point at T in (C2), as shown by the dashed line in the
figure. Clearly, we would only change the payoff obtained at time t and t+ 1 for the
case (C1) and that at time T for (C2). Let r′ denote the mean payoff of this alternate
policy. For (C1) we have
r′(t) + r′(t+ 1)− r(t)− r(t+ 1) = a
d−1
1 + ad−1
+
1
1 + ad−2
− 1
1 + ad−1
− a
d
1 + ad
=
1
1 + ad
+
1
1 + ad−2
− 2
1 + ad−1
> 0
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as 1
1+ax
is strictly convex in x for x > 0. It is clear the payoff also increases in (C2)
with this change. Thus the payoff can always be increased by folding down such
“peaks” if they exist. This eventually leads us to the greedy policy where ∆(t) ≤ 1
at all times.
t t+ 1t - 1
(C1) (C2)
TT
· · · · · · · · ·
- 1
Figure 2.1: The change of policy in the two-channel scenario.
Theorem II.7. The greedy policy is optimal for the finite-horizon problem (2.1).
2.2.2 Against Adaptive Attack with Unknown Patterns
In the second case, we consider the more realistic scenario when the user has no
such information on the attacker’s behavior, and both sides then fight in the dark.
Because of the informational symmetry between the two sides, we assume the user
also behaves as an online learner with no-regret guarantee, and we are interested in
the asymptotic interaction.
Suppose an arbitrary pair of policies gw and gu of the user and the attacker that are
determined by a pair of no-regret learning algorithms. Utilizing the no-regret property
as in the proof of Theorem II.5, it trivially follows that r¯w(gw, gu, T ) ≥ n−1n + o(1)
and r¯u(gw, gu, T ) ≥ 1n + o(1), where the o(1) terms are w.r.t. the growth of T . Note
that r¯w(gw, gu) + r¯u(gw, gu) = 1 for any gw and gu. We hence reach the conclusion
that any pair of no-regret learning algorithm are mutually best responses for the
infinite-horizon problem, and up to a diminishing term over a finite horizon. We
note that our jamming game is of a zero-sum (constant-sum) nature, and the above
result is essentially a restatement of the known convergence of learning limit to Nash
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equilibrium (NE) in zero-sum games (Chapter 4, [58]). Furthermore, it is clear that
in this case there is no loss for the user compared to the baseline when it knows the
adaptive pattern of the adversary and responses optimally.
2.3 The Decoy Dilemma
The previous results on the average payoff of the user against a learning attacker
are in essence negative. The user cannot effectively escape the curse by the strong
performance guarantee blessed to the attacker, even with more information. There-
fore, we further consider the situation when there are additional resources available
to the user to enhance the defense. In particular, we consider the one when the use
of a decoy is viable. A decoy by the user is a device capable of performing similar le-
gitimate operations as the user, and indistinguishable to the attacker (i.e., a double).
For example, the decoy can be a regular but much cheaper transceiver, one without
the ability to receive or perform channel switching. Intuitively, the introduction of a
decoy can artificially create the impression of a “most user-active” channel so as to
attract a majority of the attacks, thereby allowing the user to perform “under the
radar” in a channel less likely to be jammed.
Indeed, this idea can be immediately verified in the infinite-horizon problem for
the known case. Define a greedy decoy policy by letting the decoy and the user re-
spectively select the channels with the highest and the lowest probabilities (the worst
and the best channels) to be attacked. This policy causes the decoy to persistently
transmit in one channel, and the user to use other channels in a round-robin fashion.
It is easy to show that r¯w(gw, gu) = 1 if the attacker’s policy gu is given by a no-regret
learning algorithm, and the user’s policy gw is the above greedy decoy policy. This
asymptotic performance is optimal and less careful schemes can result in much infe-
rior gain. For example, if the user and the decoy respectively select the best and the
second best channels in each time slot, we have r¯w(gw, gu) =
n−1
n
.
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In the unknown case, the lack of prior knowledge on the attacker makes using the
decoy as a camouflage more difficult. Meanwhile, it is interesting to observe that if
the most user-active channel is unique and dominantly, that is, there exists a unique
channel k, such that for any subsequence of time slots {t1, t2, . . . , tτ(T )} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , T}
with τ(T ) = Θ(T )2,
lim inf
T→∞
1
τ(T )
τ(T )∑
i=1
1iti=k > lim sup
T→∞
1
τ(T )
τ(T )∑
i=1
1iti=j
for any j 6= k, where iti is the index of channel chosen by the user at time ti, then the
attacker can guarantee sublinear regret (uniformly or asymptotically) if and only if
all suboptimal channel are chosen with time sublinear in T asymptotically. In other
words, a strategy that guarantees sublinear regret for the attacker must ultimately
identify and aim for the dominantly user-active channel if any. Therefore, the user can
always use the decoy to “create” this dominant channel while performing operations
in a virtually jamming-free environment, by letting the decoy reside in one channel
and using a no-regret algorithm on the rest n − 1 channels. This will result in the
asymptotic optimal average reward, the same as in the case when the adversarial
behavior is known.
Embedded in this observation is an interesting dilemma that the attacker faces in
the presence of the possibility of a decoy that it cannot distinguish. On one hand, if the
attacker adopts a no-regret algorithm like Hedge, arguably the best class of algorithms
to use under uncertainty, then it is setting itself up for a very effective decoy defense by
the evader, so much so that its attacker is rendered useless (asymptotically). This is
the point illustrated above. On the other hand, if for this reason the attacker decides
not to use such algorithms, then it may face a worse outcome as the alternative
algorithm may provide no performance/regret guarantee. In this sense the mere
2τ(T ) = Θ(T ) if for any T0, there exists positive constants C1 and C2 such that C1 · T ≤ τ(T ) ≤
C2 · T for any T > T0.
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possibility or threat of using a decoy may be viewed as effective defense.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In the presentation of the previous results, we have implicitly relied on the follow-
ing assumptions:
1. The attacker can only jam a single channel in each round.
2. The payoff of the user (and accordingly the attacker) is time-invariant and
channel-independent.
The first assumption above can be trivially relaxed in light of existing no-regret
learning algorithms for multiple plays (see e.g. [54] for an immediate extension of
Hedge based on [59]), which provide decision policies to the attacker when it is capa-
ble of jamming multiple channels simultaneously, and we refer to [54] for a detailed
analysis on jamming defense against multiple attacks. We have seen that a decoy can
asymptotically negate the learning ability of the attacker in the last section. Con-
versely, the effect of the decoy can also be neutralized if multiple attacks are feasible.
Hence, a potential arm race may arise between the user and the attacker, and the
eventual outcome of this interaction then depends on the relative strength of the two
sides.
In contrast to the second implicit assumption in this chapter, a time-varying and
channel dependent payoff would allow us to model, for example, the temporal and
spectral diversity in general communication systems. We provide in [54] a paral-
lel discussion for channel-dependent but time-invariant payoffs. On the other hand,
the discussion on time-varying but channel-independent payoffs can be found in [55],
where the time-varying but channel-independent payoffs are results of transmission
power control by the user on physically symmetric and stationary channels. In prin-
ciple, the two aspects in the joint control, namely channel selection and transmission
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power, are coupled for optimal control w.r.t. properly defined objectives. Interest-
ingly, we show in [55], when confronting an online learning attacker as in this chapter,
that the optimal transmission power control can be decoupled from the optimal chan-
nel switching, or so-called “one-way” decoupling of the joint control. Also, the overall
joint control problem can be reduced to a rate maximization problem with the tuning
transmission power only. This decoupling is an immediate result following from the
no-regret property of learning algorithm as we have seen in this chapter.
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CHAPTER III
Optimal Channel Switching as Jamming Defense -
Part II: Against a Resource-Replenishing Attacker
with Minimax Optimality
In Chapter II, the regret is considered as the performance metric against an ad-
versary with unknown behavioral pattern, and the optimality is aligned to the no-
regret criterion. In this chapter, we revisit the jamming defense problem without
prior knowledge on the attacker, and we instead consider the minimax optimality for
the worst-case optimal response. Moreover, we assume the attacker is subject to a
resource constraint with a replenishing process. That is, each action taken by the
attacker consumes an amount of its resource, which may be later replenished. This
models the power consumption of the attacker, which typically uses high power to
generate jamming signals, while its energy can be recharged via energy harvesting
from the environment or wired charging. Note that this model assumes the uncon-
strained attacker as a trivial case, where the repeated interaction can be reduced to
a one-stage zero-sum game.
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3.1 Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
Our problem formulation is within the framework as the previous problem in
Chapter II, and different details are highlighted as follows. Recall that we denote by
[n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} the action space of the user (i.e., the indexed set of channels), and
we define [n]0 := {0, 1, . . . , n} to be the action space of the attacker, where 0 is the
null action (i.e., initiating no attack). Assume that the attacker has a finite amount
of resource st at time t, and any non-null action by the attacker consumes a certain
amount of resource; it also obtains replenishment after a round. In particular, given
st and jt, the latter of which denotes the attacker’s action at t, the resource of the
attacker at t + 1 is given by st+1 = ft(st, jt), where ft is a mapping summarizing
the consumption and the replenishment process depending on the application sce-
nario. An adversarial action jt is feasible at time t given st if the causality condition
ft(st, jt) ≥ 0 holds. We denote by Ft(st) = {j ∈ [n]0 : ft(st, j) ≥ 0} the feasible action
set of the attacker at t. Let St := {s : Ft(s) = [n]0}, i.e., St is the set of all resource
levels such that all actions in [n] are feasible for the attacker. We assume the payoff
matrix of the user is given by Mw = −M := −
[
0 Mˆ
]
, where Mˆ ∈ Rn×n+ is called
the loss matrix and M the augmented loss matrix, and 0 is the zero column vector of
length n. We denote by ∆n and ∆
0
n the spaces of probability distributions on [n] and
[n]0. Given any vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn), define supp(v) = {i : vi > 0}. Define then
∆0n(s, t) = {u ∈ ∆0n : supp(u) ⊆ Ft(s)}, which is the set of distributions over feasible
actions in [n]0. As in the previous problem, the user chooses a distribution wt ∈ ∆n in
round t, and a choice of channel it ∈ [n] is realized per wt independently. The attacker
chooses a distribution ut ∈ ∆0n(st, t) based on its resource st, and an adversarial ac-
tion jt ∈ [n]0 is realized per ut independently. After consumption and replenishment,
the attacker’s available resource for the next round is given by st+1 = ft(st, jt).
Throughout this chapter, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption III.1.
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1. The user has perfect recall of all its past actions and the observed adversarial
actions.
2. The user knows the initial budget s1 of the attacker and the resource dynamics
ft for t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
The second assumption on the knowledge of the attacker’s initial budget is unreal-
istically strong. However, as we shall show that assuming an arbitrary initial budget
of the attacker has no impact on the asymptotic worst-case payoff of the user.The
goal of the user is to choose wt for each round so as to minimize the expected total
loss against all distributions over adversarial actions in a certain space, which we shall
specify shortly. The strategy of the user can be made either online or oﬄine, and in
general it can be summarized by a contingency plan described as follows. At time t,
the history of the above game consists of all past actions taken by the user and the
attacker before time t, and the resource levels up to time t. Let a realization of the
history at t be ht = 〈s1, i1, j1, s2, i2, j2, . . . , st−1, it−1, jt−1, st〉 with h1 = s1, and we
denote the set of all possible realizations of the history by H. The information state
of the user at time t is then exactly given by the history of the game, i.e., Itw = ht.
Hence, the user’s policy can be given by a mapping w : H → ∆n, where we change
the notation from gw to w for typographical simplicity, and we denote the space of all
such mappings/policies as G. We adopt the following notion of a (strong) attacker. It
chooses the distribution of adversarial actions following a mapping u : H → ∆0n such
that u(ht) ∈ ∆0n(st, t) given the realization of history ht up to time t; we denote the
space of all such mappings as G0. The user’s objective is to minimize the worst-case
loss:
min
w∈G
max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht)
}
. (3.1)
Note that we could also consider a weaker attacker, who chooses adversarial actions
according to a mapping u : R × N → ∆0n such that u(st, t) ∈ ∆0n(st, t) given the
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resource level st at time t. As we show later, this weak attacker can be as damaging
as a strong attacker in the context of the above decision problem for the user.
While we have not explicitly stated whether the attacker is strategic, the minimax
formulation means that the user shall treat the attacker as strategic. More specifi-
cally, letW (w, u) = −E
{∑T
t=1 w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht)
}
= −U(w, u), and consider a zero-sum
strategic game G where the two players are respectively given the strategy spaces G
and G0 with the payoff functions W , U . Then, a Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy for
player 1 (the user) in G is exactly a minimaximizer of (3.1). The above game the-
oretical interpretation of (3.1) regards the entire rounds of interaction as a one-shot
game. On the other hand, the sequential interaction between the two players results
in an extensive game Γ with simultaneous moves, where any realization of the history
labels a particular node in the game tree. There exists at least one subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) for Γ [60], which is also a NE of G. Hence, the minimaximizer of
(3.1) exists. We denote by (w∗, u∗) a pair of SPE (or simply equilibrium when there
is no ambiguity) strategies for the user and the attacker, and this pair will also be
called an optimal solution to (3.1); in particular w∗ is a minimaximizer to (3.1) and
u∗ a corresponding maximizer given w∗. Also, note that the pair (u∗, w∗) is a solution
to the problem
max
u∈G0
min
w∈G
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht)
}
. (3.2)
For technical reasons, we will consider a slightly perturbed version of problem
(3.1) as an intermediate step in our analysis. Let ǫ : R→ R+ be a strictly increasing
function parameterized by ǫmax, such that ǫ(s) ≤ ǫmax for all s ∈ R+, where ǫmax is a
predetermined constant. The perturbed problem is then given by
min
w∈G
max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + ǫ(sT )
}
. (3.3)
With a similar argument used for (3.1), we can show an minimax-optimal solution
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exists for (3.3), which coincides with the SPE of the extensive game induced by (3.3).
For the perturbed problem, we will inherit all the notation from (3.1), e.g., w∗ is an
optimal solution to (3.3). We note that if (w∗, u∗) is a solution to (3.3), the resulting
loss in (3.1) is at most ǫmax more than the optimal minimax loss, and a similar result
holds for (3.2), as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma III.2. Let
ℓ(w) := max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht)
}
and
g(u) := min
w∈G
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht)
}
.
If wˆ∗ and uˆ∗ are respective optimal solutions to (3.1) and (3.2), then ℓ(w∗) ≤ ℓ(wˆ∗)+
ǫmax and g(u
∗) ≥ g(uˆ∗)− ǫmax.
Proof. For the first inequality, we have
ℓ(w∗) ≤ max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
t=1
w∗(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + ǫ(sT )
}
= min
w∈G
max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + ǫ(sT )
}
≤ max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
t=1
wˆ∗(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + ǫ(sT )
}
≤ max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
t=1
wˆ∗(ht)
⊤Mu(ht)
}
+ ǫmax = ℓ(wˆ
∗) + ǫmax.
Similarly,
g(u∗) = max
u∈G0
min
w∈G
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + ǫ(sT )− ǫ(sT )
}
≥ min
w∈G
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Muˆ∗(ht) + ǫ(sT )
}
− ǫmax
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≥ min
w∈G
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Muˆ∗(ht)
}
− ǫmax = g(uˆ∗)− ǫmax.
We proceed with the following assumptions.
Assumption III.3.
1. ft is strictly increasing in the first argument.
2. ft(s, 0) > ft(s, i) for all i ∈ [n] and s ≥ 0.
The next lemma states in searching for the optimal strategy of the user we can
limit our attention to a space smaller than G; similarly, we can reduce the search
space for the attacker’s strategy. In fact, it can be reduced to that of a weak attacker
as defined earlier. Let G˜ := {w ∈ G : w(ht) = w(h′t), if st = s′t, ∀t} and let G˜t :=
{w ∈ G : w(hτ) = w(h′τ), if sτ = s′τ , ∀τ ≥ t}, hence G˜ = G˜1. Similarly, we define G˜0
as a subset of G0 and G˜0t .
Lemma III.4.
min
w∈G
max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + ǫ(sT )
}
= min
w∈G˜
max
u∈G˜0
E
{
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + ǫ(sT )
}
.
Proof. We show any optimal strategy can be replaced by a strategy in G˜ without loss
of optimality, and we prove by backward induction on the step of replacement. At T ,
given any hT , w
∗ and u∗ solve the following problem
min
w∈G
max
u∈G0
w(hT )
⊤Mu(hT ) + ǫ(sT ).
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Let wT ∈ ∆n and uT ∈ ∆0n(sT , T ) be a NE of the one-stage matrix game with the
respective payoff matrix −M and M for the user and the adversary. Clearly, a pair
of NE strategies only depend on sT . Replacing w
∗(hT ) and u
∗(hT ) with w
T and uT
for all hT , we obtain an alternative optimal solution in G˜T and G˜0T .
Assume w∗ ∈ G˜t+1 and u∗ ∈ G˜0t+1. Given ht at t, (w∗, u∗) solves
min
w∈G
max
u∈G0
E
{
T∑
τ=t
w(hτ )
⊤Mu(hτ ) + ǫ(sT )
∣∣∣∣ ht
}
= min
w∈G˜t+1
max
u∈G˜0t+1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + E
{
E
{
T∑
τ=t+1
w(hτ)
⊤Mu(hτ ) + ǫ(sT )
∣∣∣∣ ht+1
} ∣∣∣∣ ht
}
= min
w∈G˜t+1
max
u∈G˜0t+1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) + E{Wt+1(w, u, st+1)|ht} (3.4)
= min
w∈G˜t+1
max
u∈G˜0t+1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht) +
n∑
j=0
uj(ht)Wt+1(w, u, ft(st, j))
where in (3.4) we let Wt+1(w, u, st+1) := E
{∑T
τ=t+1 w(hτ)
⊤Mu(hτ ) + ǫ(sT ) | ht+1
}
since w(hτ ) and u(hτ ) only depend on sτ for all τ ≥ t+1 for all w, u ∈ G˜t+1. Replacing
respectively w∗(h′t) and u
∗(h′t) by w
∗(ht) and u
∗(ht) for all h
′
t ∈ H such that s′t = st,
we obtain an alternative optimal solution in G˜t and G˜0t , thus completing our proof.
This result shows that actions in an optimal strategy can be identical for any two
nodes in the game tree labeled by ht and h
′
t as long as st = s
′
t (i.e., Markovian in
terms of st). Hence, we can reduce the representation of the label of node from the
full history ht to a two-tuple (st, t). With slight abuse of notation, we denote w(ht)
as w(st, t) for all w ∈ G˜, and denote by (w∗, u∗) ∈ G˜×G˜0 an optimal solution to (3.3).
We will refer to a subgame rooted at a node labeled by (st, t) as a subgame (st, t),
and we define the payoff of a subgame (st, t) for the attacker using u
∗ provided w∗ as
U∗t (st) := E
{
T∑
τ=t
w∗(sτ , τ)
⊤Mu∗(sτ , τ) + ǫ(sT )
∣∣∣∣ st
}
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= max
u∈G˜0
min
w∈G˜
E
{
T∑
τ=t
w(sτ , τ)
⊤Mu(sτ , τ) + ǫ(sT )
∣∣∣∣ st
}
.
Using the perturbation term, we next show the monotonicity of U∗t .
Lemma III.5. U∗t (st) is strictly increasing in st for all t.
Proof. We prove by induction. Given sT at time T , we have
U∗T (sT ) = w
∗(sT , T )Mu
∗(sT , T ) + ǫ(sT ) = v(sT ) + ǫ(sT )
where v(sT ) is the value of the last stage game, i.e.
v(sT ) := max
u∈∆0n(sT ,T )
min
w∈∆n
w⊤Mu.
Since ∆0n(s, t) ⊇ ∆0n(s′, t) for all t if s > s′, v(sT ) is increasing in sT , and hence
U∗T (sT ) is strictly increasing in sT . Assume the monotonicity for t+1. Let Mi be the
(i + 1)-th column of M (the j-th column of Mˆ), and let st > s
′
t. We also use wi or
ui to denote the i-th or the (i+1)-th coordinate (function) of w ∈ ∆n and w ∈ G˜, or
u ∈ ∆0n or u ∈ G˜0. Then,
U∗t (st) = w
∗(st, t)
⊤Mu∗(st, t) +
n∑
i=0
u∗i (st, t)U
∗
t+1(ft(st, i))
= max
u∈∆0n(st,t)
min
w∈∆n
{
w⊤Mu +
n∑
i=0
uiU
∗
t+1(ft(st, i))
}
≥ min
w∈∆n
{
w⊤Mu∗(s′t, t) +
n∑
i=0
u∗i (s
′
t, t)U
∗
t+1(ft(st, i))
}
.
Note that F (w) := w⊤Mu∗(s′t, t) +
∑n
i=0 u
∗
i (s
′
t, t)U
∗
t+1(ft(st, i)) is a linear function of
w, and hence the minimum is attained at some w˜ ∈ ∆n. Also, note that for any
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i ∈ supp(u∗(s′t, t)), we have ft(st, i) > ft(s′t, i) ≥ 0. Hence,
U∗t (st) ≥ F (w˜) > w˜⊤Mu∗(s′t, t) +
n∑
i=0
u∗i (s
′
t, t)U
∗
t+1(ft(s
′
t, i))
≥ min
w∈∆n
{
w⊤Mu∗(s′t, t) +
n∑
i=0
u∗i (s
′
t, t)U
∗
t+1(ft(s
′
t, i))
}
= w∗(s′t, t)
⊤Mu∗(s′t, t) +
n∑
i=0
u∗i (s
′
t, t)U
∗
t+1(ft(s
′
t, i)) = U
∗
t (s
′
t),
which completes the induction.
With the above preliminary results, we proceed in the next section to analyze the
optimal response from the user.
3.2 Channel Switching for Minimax Optimality
In this section, we assume Mˆ = diag(c1, c2, . . . , cn). This corresponds to the loss
induced by a binary collision model, and the generalization is discussed in Section 3.3.
We present the following main results.
1. The optimal strategy of the user in the perturbed problem (3.3) is to optimally
respond to an attacker, who (a) either takes the null action with probability
one or takes action i with probability qi :=
1/ci∑n
j=1 1/cj
for all i ∈ [n] when st ∈ St,
and (b) takes the null action with probability one when st /∈ St.
2. Under additional conditions on the resource dynamics ft, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the
optimal strategy of the user in problem (3.1) is to optimally respond to an
attacker, who (a) randomizes independently and identically at each round and
takes action i with probability qi when st ∈ St, and (b) takes the null action
with probability one when st /∈ St.
We will refer to the first part of the above claim as the basic characterization,
and the second part as the characterization with structure on the replenishment. We
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also study the asymptotic average worst-case cost of the user applying the optimal
strategy at the end of this section.
3.2.1 Basic Characterization
We proceed with a series of characterization on the optimal strategy as shown in
the following lemmas.
Lemma III.6. Any SPE strategy u∗ ∈ G˜0 for the attacker is such that either u∗0(st, t) =
1 or supp(u∗(st, t)) ⊇ [n].
Proof. Let (w∗, u∗) ∈ G˜ × G˜0 be a pair of SPE strategies. Assume that u∗0(st, t) <
1, and let N := [n] − supp(u∗(st, t)). If N 6= ∅, then supp(w∗(st, t)) ⊆ N , i.e.,
supp(w∗(st, t)) ∩ supp(u∗(st, t)) = ∅. Otherwise, the payoff of any subgame (st, t) for
the user using w∗ provided u∗, which is given by
W ∗t (st) := E
{
−
T∑
τ=t
w∗(sτ , τ)
⊤Mu∗(sτ , τ)− ǫ(sT )
∣∣∣∣ st
}
=
n∑
i=1
w∗i (st, t)(−u∗i (st, t)ci +
n∑
j=0
u∗j(st, t)W
∗
t+1(ft(st, j)))
= −
n∑
i=1
w∗i (st, t)u
∗
i (st, t)ci +
n∑
j=0
u∗j(st, t)W
∗
t+1(ft(st, j)), (3.5)
can be strictly improved by reallocating the probability mass on any action i ∈
supp(u∗(st, t)) to an action j ∈ N .
Then, we have
U∗t (st) = u
∗
0(st, t)U
∗
t+1(ft(st, 0)) +
n∑
i=1
u∗i (st, t)(w
∗
i (st, t)ci + U
∗
t+1(ft(st, i))) (3.6)
=
∑
i∈supp(u∗(st,t))
u∗i (st, t)U
∗
t+1(ft(st, i)) < U
∗
t+1(ft(st, 0)),
where the last inequality is due to Assumption III.3 and Lemma III.5. Hence, the
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payoff of the attacker can be strictly improved by choosing the null action with
probability one, which contradicts the fact that u∗ is a SPE strategy. Therefore,
supp(u∗(st)) ⊇ [n].
Lemma III.7. For a pair of SPE strategies (w∗, u∗), if supp(u∗(st, t)) ⊇ [n], then
supp(w∗(st, t)) = [n].
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that ft(st, i) ≥ ft(st, j) for any i ≥ j > 0.
Assume that there exists i1 ∈ [n] such that i1 /∈ supp(w∗(st, t)). Since U∗t+1(ft(st, 0)) >
U∗t+1(ft(st, i1)), by reallocatng the probability mass to the null action, the attacker can
strictly improve its payoff of any subgame (st, t), thus resulting in a contradiction.
Lemma III.8. Given any pair of SPE strategies (w∗, u∗), then
u∗i (st, t) = qi(1− u∗0(st, t))
for all i ∈ [n], and when u∗0(st, t) < 1,
w∗i (st, t) =
U∗t (st)− U∗t+1(ft(st, i))
ci
.
Proof. For u∗, the result is trivial when u∗0(st, t) = 1. Assuming u
∗
0(st, t) < 1, we
then have supp(u∗(st, t)) ⊇ [n] by Lemma III.6, and thus supp(w∗(st, t)) = [n] by
Lemma III.7. Hence, referring to (3.5) by the indifference condition of equilibrium
points, we have
u∗i (st, t)ci = u
∗
j(st, t)cj
for all i, j ∈ [n]. Therefore, u∗i (st, t) = qi(1 − u∗0(st, t)). For w∗, referring to to (3.6),
we have
w∗i (st, t)ci + U
∗
t+1(ft(st, i)) = U
∗
t (st),
for all i ∈ [n], and the result follows.
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Lemma III.9. Let (w∗, u∗) be a pair of SPE strategies. If 0 < u∗0(s, t) < 1 for some
s ∈ St and t, then there exists a strategy u˜ such that u˜0(s, t) = 0 for all s ∈ St and t,
and (w∗, u˜) is a pair of SPE strategies. The space of such strategies will be denoted
by G†.
Proof. Assume that 0 < u∗0(st, t) < 1 for some st ∈ St and t. Then, by Lemma III.8
we have supp(u∗) ⊇ [n] and u∗i (st, t) = 1/ci∑n
j=1 1/cj
(1− u∗0(st, t)) for all i ∈ [n]. Also,
U∗t (st) = w
∗
i ci + U
∗
t+1(ft(st, i))
for all i ∈ [n], where U∗t+1(ft(st, i)) only depends on u∗(·, τ) and w∗(·, τ) for all τ > t.
Consider an alternative strategy for the attacker such that u˜ = u∗ except u˜0(st, t) = 0
and u˜i(st, t) =
1/ci∑n
j=1 1/cj
. Referring to (3.5), we note that the continuation part (i.e.,
the second term) of the user’s payoff of the subgame rooted at (st, t) is independent
of the user’s action at t, and note also the values of u˜i(st, t)ci are equal among all
i ∈ [n]. Hence, given u˜, the user has no incentive to deviate from w∗. On the other
hand, the attacker’s payoff of the subgame rooted at (st, t) using u˜ given w
∗ is
n∑
i=1
u˜i(st, t)(w
∗
i ci + U
∗
t+1(ft(st, i))) = U
∗
t (st).
Therefore, (w∗, u˜) is a pair of SPE strategies. Repeating this argument on u˜ whenever
necessary, we can obtain a SPE strategy of the attacker as described in the lemma.
The above results are summarized in the first part of the claim at the beginning
of this section, which we reproduce in the following theorem.
Theorem III.10. Consider a policy of the attacker such that either ui(st, t) = qi :=
1/ci∑n
j=1 1/cj
for all i ∈ [n] or u0(st, t) = 1 if st ∈ St and u0(st, t) = 1 if st /∈ St.
The optimal strategy of the user in problem (3.3) is to optimally respond to such an
adversarial policy.
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The weakness of the above result is clearly the ambiguity in determining the
“either-or” branch of the adversarial policy when st ∈ St. In some applied instances,
we can reason that the attacker would not use the null action in the perturbed problem
and extend this conclusion to the original one, and hence obtain an explicit form of
the user’s optimal strategy. This illustrated using the following example.
Example. Assume that ft(s, i) < s for all i ∈ [n], and ft(s, 0) = s, i.e., the
attacker only has a finite budget of resource without replenishment. Let δmin :=
infs≥0,i∈[n](s − ft(s, i)), and assume that δmin > 0. Let T > s1δmin , i.e., the horizon
is beyond the time that the attacker would exhaust its resource if it always takes a
non-null action. Note that whenever u0(st, t) = 1, the game is equivalently shortened
by one time step. Hence, we can reduce the strategy space of the attacker to the
set of strategies such that u0(st, t) = 0 for all t whenever st ∈ St. Then, we have
u∗i (st, t) = qi for all t whenever st ∈ St. Hence, the attacker’s equilibrium strategy is
to identically and independently randomize before exhausting the resource. Note that
u∗ we obtained is independent from the perturbation parameter ǫmax, and moreover,
using Lemma III.2 we have g(u∗) ≥ g(uˆ∗) − ǫmax for any ǫmax > 0, where g(uˆ∗) is
the optimal value of (3.2). Hence, u∗ is an optimal solution to (3.2), and an optimal
strategy of the user in (3.1) is to optimally respond to this belief on the adversarial
behavior. In particular, it has the structure shown in Lemma III.8 by setting the
perturbation term to zero. Let T (st) be the minimum time τ such that sτ /∈ Sτ
given the resource level st at t, when the action iτ taken by the attacker at each
round τ ≥ t is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with the distribution
q = (qi, i ∈ [n]). Note that
ET (st) = E
{
T∑
τ=t
1(sτ ∈ Sτ )
∣∣∣∣ st
}
,
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and
E{w∗iτ (sτ , τ)ciτ | st} = E{w∗iτ (sτ , τ)ciτ | sτ ∈ Sτ , st} · P(sτ ∈ Sτ | st)
=
1∑
j=1 1/cj
E{1(sτ ∈ Sτ ) | st}.
Then,
U∗t (st) = E
{
T∑
τ=t
w∗iτ (sτ , τ)ciτ
∣∣∣∣ st
}
=
1∑
j=1 1/cj
E
{
T∑
τ=t
1(sτ ∈ Sτ )
∣∣∣∣ st
}
=
1∑
j=1 1/cj
ET (st),
and the optimal strategy of the user is given by
w∗i (st, t) =
U∗t (st)− U∗t+1(ft(st, i))
ci
=
1∑
j=1 1/cj
ET (st)− ET (ft(st, i))
ci
before T (st). In fact, this is the optimal strategy found by Abernethy and Warmuth
constructively in [61].
3.2.2 Characterization with Structure on the Replenishment
As aforementioned, the difficulty of applying Theorem III.10 is that we have to
determine whether the attacker chooses the null action with probability one even
when all non-null actions are feasible. Intuitively, the only incentive for the attacker
to take the null action in such cases is to save resources for a rainy day. However,
this incentive goes away if it eventually takes a non-null action and the resource
dynamics from that point on is the same had it switched the order of these two
actions. This intuitive argument suggests that with more structure imposed on the
resource dynamics ft, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , we may be able to conclude a more explicit
form on the user’s optimal strategy as shown in the above example. Indeed, we make
the following assumption on the structure of the resource dynamics, and justify our
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previous conjecture in Lemma III.12.
Assumption III.11.
1. ft+1(ft(s, i), j) = ft+1(ft(s, j), i) for any i, j ∈ [n] and all t .
2. For any s ∈ St and t < T , ft(s, 0) ∈ St+1 and there exists i ∈ [n] such that
ft(s, i) ∈ St+1.
Let v be the value of a stage game when all non-null actions are feasbile, i.e., v :=
minw∈∆n maxu∈∆0n w
⊤Mu = 1∑n
j=1 1/cj
, and let qmin := mini∈[n] qi. Set ǫmax < qminv.
Lemma III.12. If (w∗, u∗) is a pair of SPE strategies and u∗ ∈ G†, then u∗0(s, t) = 0
for any s ∈ St and all t.
For the sake of readability, the lengthy proof of the above lemma is placed in the
appendix, and it proves the second part of our claim at the beginning of this section,
which is repeated in the following theorem.
Theorem III.13. Consider a policy of the attacker such that ui(st, t) = qi :=
1/ci∑n
j=1 1/cj
for all i ∈ [n] if st ∈ St and u0(st, t) = 1 if st /∈ St. The optimal strategy of the user
in problem (3.1) is to optimally respond to such an adversarial policy.
Proof. Lemma III.12 directly proves the above claim for the perturbed problem (3.3).
Using the same argument as shown in the example after Theorem III.10, we conclude
that the described adversarial strategy is also an equilibrium strategy in the original
problem (3.1), and the result follows.
The optimal strategy of the user is then given as in Lemma III.8, where U∗ can
be similarly estimated using Monte-Carlo method as in [61].
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3.2.3 Asymptotics
We next consider the average worst-case cost κ using the minimax optimal strat-
egy, which is given by
κ := lim sup
T→∞
min
w∈G
max
u∈G0
E
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht)
}
. (3.7)
In this part, we assume a stationary and linear resource replenishment process, that
is,
ft(s, i) = f(s, i) = s− di + γ
for all i ∈ [n]0, where di is the resource cost of action i and γ is the resource
replenishment rate. We assume d0 = 0 and without loss of generality, suppose
0 = d0 ≤ d1 ≤ . . . ≤ dn. We also assume that γ ≥ d1. Hence, f satisfies Assump-
tion III.3 and III.11. Let sth = min{dn−γ, 0}, and then St = [sth,∞). Consequently,
using Theorem III.13, we can regard the attacker as behaving randomly and taking
action from [n] with the probability distribution q whenever s ≥ sth, and choosing the
null action with probability one if short of resource. Let St be the random process
of the attacker’s resource level. Let Xt := 1(St ≥ sth). Let Ct ∈ {c1, . . . , cn} be
an i.i.d. process with P(Ct = ci) = qi for all i, and similarly we define a process
Dt ∈ {d1, . . . , dn}. Moreover, we assume that Ct and Dt are respectively independent
from all Xs with s < t. Then, the resource dynamics can be written as
St+1 = St −DtXt + γ,
and the average cost of the user is given by
κ = lim sup
T→∞
E
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
CtXt
}
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ECtEXt
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= ECt · ρ = n∑n
j=1 1/ci
· ρ,
where ρ := lim sup
T→∞
E
{
1
T
∑T
t=1Xt
}
. Note that St admits a stationary distribution
(i.e. stable) if and only if EDt > γ. Indeed, consider the two auxiliary queues S
′
t
and S ′′t that are given by S
′
t+1 = S
′
t − Dt + γ, and S ′′t+1 = max{S ′′t − Dt, sth} + γ.
Then, S ′t ≤ St ≤ S ′′t and the two auxiliary queues are positive recurrent if and only if
EDt > γ. When St is stable, we have
0 = lim
T→∞
1
T
(
Tγ −
T∑
i=1
E[DtXt]
)
= lim
T→∞
(
γ − EDt · E
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt
})
= γ − EDt · ρ.
Hence, when St is stable, ρ =
γ
EDt
=
γ
∑n
j=1 1/cj∑n
i=1 di/ci
< 1 and
κ =
γ
1
n
∑n
i=1 di/ci
=
γ
α
,
where α := 1
n
∑n
i=1 di/ci can be interpreted as the average cost-gain ratio of adver-
sarial actions. When EDt < γ, St grows unbounded and we have ρ = 1. Thus,
κ = n∑n
j=1 1/cj
in this case, the harmonic mean of ci’s.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
In the previous section, we presented the minimax optimal strategy of the user
when the cost matrix is assumed to be diagonal, which models binary collision. There
are a number of open problems arising from the previous result.
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3.3.1 Non-negative Mˆ
Moving from the binary collision model to a more general interference model,
we will need to revisit our problem with an arbitrary non-negative cost matrix. We
observe that the theory we developed so far for the diagonal Mˆ applies trivially to the
case when Mˆ = D+c11⊤, when D is a diagonal matrix, i.e., Mˆij is a constant c for all
off-diagonal entries, by simply noting that w⊤Mˆu = w⊤(D+ c11⊤)u = w⊤Du+ c. A
more interesting case that can be reduced to a diagonal one is when Mˆ is a multiple
of a doubly-stochastic matrix Q, i.e., Mˆ = zQ for some z > 0. We proceed with the
following fact.
Lemma III.14 ([62]). If each row sum of a non-singular matrix is a constant z, then
each row sum of its inverse matrix is 1/z. The same applies to the column sums.
Hence, Mˆ−11 = 1⊤Mˆ−1 = 1/z. Consider then the following construction. Let
Dˆ = diag−1(1⊤Mˆ−1) = zI, and let D =
[
0 Dˆ
]
. For any uˆ ∈ ∆0n, let u = Kuˆ
where K :=
1
Mˆ−1Dˆ
. Then, Mu = [0 Mˆ]
1
Mˆ−1Dˆ
 uˆ = Duˆ. Let Θ =
{Kuˆ | uˆ ∈ ∆0n}. Note that uˆ = K−1u ∈ ∆0n for any u ∈ ∆0n. Hence, Θ ⊇ ∆0n.
Consider a mapping u : H → Θ, and denote the space of all such mappings as AΘ.
Let V (w, u) := E
{∑T
t=1w(ht)
⊤Mu(ht)
}
. Then,
max
u∈A
min
w∈A
V (w, u) ≤ max
u∈AΘ
min
w∈A
V (w, u) = max
uˆ∈A
min
w∈A
V (w, u).
For the problem on the right-hand side, our previous result implies that uˆ∗i (ht) =
qi(1 − uˆ∗0(ht)) = 1n(1 − uˆ∗0(ht)). Interestingly, u(ht) = Kuˆ∗(ht) is in fact equal to
uˆ∗(ht). Hence, we obtain an optimal solution to the problem on the left-hand side.
However, a natural interference model may not be captured by a doubly stochastic
structure.
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3.3.2 Conversion to a Gain Formulation
In this chapter, we focused on the loss formulation for the user instead of a gain
perspective. The problem could be revisited with a gain matrix for the user, and the
role of min-max would be exchanged for the user and the attacker. Unlike the loss
formulation, we could have developed a theory of the adversarial channel capacity
in the presence of a jammer, which would be in parallel to the asymptotic result
presented in the previous section. The two formulations are intuitively equivalent in
the sense that a gain formulation can always be converted to a loss one by setting
the gain matrix as the difference between a multiple of the all-one matrix and a loss
matrix. However, the solution technique requires the full characterization of optimal
strategies with an arbitrary non-negative loss matrix, as stated in the first open
problem. Moreover, we note a fundamental difference can be found in the rationale
of decision for the user between the two formulations, which in turn suggests that
the user’s optimal strategy may be considerably different even for other categories
of loss matrices compared to the results for diagonal-related ones. As shown before,
the user would strictly prefer a channel that is not in the support of the attacker’s
strategy in the loss setting, so as to incur no cost. However, the user would prefer
to risk using a channel on which the attacker puts positive probability mass, if the
gain of this action is much higher than that of a jamming-free one, thus favorable in
expectation.
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CHAPTER IV
Throughput Optimal Channel Switching in
Random Access - Part I: Intuition from Slotted
Aloha
In the previous two chapters, we have considered the interplay between a legitimate
user and an adversary with conflicting interest. In many applications, the adversary
is often a competing peer user rather than a malicious entity, e.g. a jamming attacker.
Also, in practical systems, it typically involves a large number of interacting users;
the user behavior is typically regulated by the deployed protocol. From this chapter
on, we hence will consider a group of users (or nodes interchangeably) competing for
spectrum resources, and we consider the decentralized channel switching policies of
users in a multi-channel wireless system with medium access regulated by a given
protocol, so as to maximize the overall throughput of the network. In particular, we
consider the possibility of promoting certain performance measures, e.g. throughput,
via individual learning as a way to obtain decentralized implementations of desirable
policies.
Motivated by the above, in the next two chapters we ask the question of what
type of dynamic channel switching schemes will give the best performance in a multi-
channel WLAN. This will be evaluated using the notion of stability region of a scheme.
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This is because more effective resource allocation and sharing can achieve a lower
overall congestion level, thus expanding the range of sustainable arrival rates and
resulting in a larger stability region. The scheme with the largest such region is
commonly known as the throughput optimal scheme. With this objective, we set
out to study the stability region of a multi-channel WLAN system where users are
allowed to dynamically switch between channels, and identify throughput optimal
channel-switching schemes for the entire system.
Our ultimate goal is to develop a theory on the throughput optimal switching for
networks regulated by the IEEE 802.11 DCF (Distributed Coordination Function), a
widely deployed contention-based MAC layer protocol. This chapter aims to provide
theoretical preparation and intuition for our later analysis in DCF, using the simpler
slotted Aloha scheme. We formally address the question on throughput optimality in
DCF in Chapter IV.
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Slotted Aloha and IEEE 802.11 DCF
Aloha [63, 64] is technically the prototype of a wide range of contention-based
random access schemes including 802.11 DCF. An extensive discussion on several
variants in the Aloha family of protocols can be found in [65]. We shall focus on the
slotted Aloha scheme in this analysis. Unlike reservation-based schemes that utilize,
for instance, time-sharing or frequency-sharing to coordinate the medium access, the
“free-for-all” approach embedded in slotted Aloha aims to improve the throughput
when the traffic is light or moderate, when collision is expected to be rare. Under
slotted Aloha, the system operates in discrete time with a uniform length for each time
slot. Furthermore, all packets are assumed to require exactly one slot for transmission.
Users are assumed to be synchronized, and a user i attempts data transmission at
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the beginning of a time slot with probability τi if its queue of packets is non-empty.
Note that this is a simplified version of slotted Aloha in the sense that any node is
regarded as backlogged immediately upon packet arrival to an empty queue. If two
or more nodes attempt transmissions in the same slot, a collision occurs and packets
transmitted are lost (un-decodable); this is assumed to be observable to all nodes
involved, and retransmissions take place with the same attempt rates in future slots.
Instead of using coin toss to determine whether a transmission should be at-
tempted, the 802.11 DCF utilizes a process called backoff to further reduce potential
collision. The basic idea is for nodes involved in a collision to select and start a
random timer that counts down to zero; a node only attempts retransmission when
the time expires. Upon each successive collision on the retransmission, a node selects
the random timer value from an exponentially increasing range, with the intention
that more nodes will back off for longer thereby avoiding further collision. More is
detailed in Chapter V.
4.1.2 Stability and Throughput Optimality
The notion of stability throughout this chapter and the next one refers to the
existence of limiting distribution of the queueing processes of packets at each user,
when the packet queueing is appropriately defined. When the queues are modeled
by (irreducible and aperiodic) Markov chains, the stability criterion will specifically
be the existence of stationary distribution. The stability region is given by the set of
vectors of data/packet arrival rates, such that all queues are stable. A throughput
optimal channel switching policy, when the form of policy is appropriately defined, is
one that results in a stability region that is the superset of that of any other policy
under comparison, if it exists. Formal definitions of these notions will be reviewed in
Section 5.2.
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4.2 Decentralized Throughput Optimal Switching via Indi-
vidual Learning
In this section, we consider the interaction in a multi-channel system governed by
the simple slotted Aloha scheme, and apply existing results from population game to
gain insight on the nature of throughput optimal switching policies. Our results will
also shed light on possible decentralized implementations for more complex random
access schemes like the DCF. As we shall see, starting from this simpler, slotted Aloha
scheme will continue to offer insightful interpretation of our analysis in the setup of
DCF later.
We will limit our attention to a homogeneous population of users with identical
traffic loads and attempt rates. On the other hand we will model the asymmetry
in channel bandwidth by adopting different real-time scales of time slots in different
channels. The above setup is summarized as follows:
• The network operates in discrete slots t = 1, 2, . . .. There are N users and K
channels. A slot on channel k has a duration of αk time units; a smaller numeric
value of αk models a physically faster channel in data rate.
• Each node has an infinite queue. Packets arrival according to a Poisson process
with rate λ, independent from arrivals of other users and the medium access
scheme. Hence, the number of arrivals to a node between two consecutive slot
boundaries is a Poisson random variable with mean λk = αkλ in channel k.
• At the boundary of a slot, whenever its queue is non-empty, a node attempts
transmission of the packet at the head of the queue with probability τ . Multiple
transmissions from different users result in a collision and all packets involved
will remain in their queues.
This simple model captures some essential aspects of a network operating under
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DCF, and we aim to gain some insights on the following two questions:
• What type of centralized static allocation policy is throughput optimal?
• Is it possible to reach/approximate the throughput optimal channel allocation
via individual learning over repeated interactions?
4.2.1 Centralized throughput optimal policy
Given the homogeneity of the population, an allocation of channels can be given by
a vector (n1, n2, . . . , nK), where nk denotes the number of users assigned to channel
k with
∑K
i=1 nk = N . Given any allocation of channels, it can be represented by
the corresponding population state, which is defined by x = (x1, x2, . . . , xK) where
xk =
nk
N
. We denote the space of population states by XN = ∆K ∩ 1NZK , where ∆K
is the simplex in RK . A centralized channel allocation policy is hence identified by
a mapping φ : R+ → XN such that given a symmetric arrival rate λ for all users, it
generates a population state.
Given a population state x, consider channel k and relabel the Nxk users on
this channel from 1 to Nxk. Let Q
t
i be the queue length of node i on channel k
at time t, and let Qt = (Qt1, Q
t
2, . . . , Q
t
Nxk
). It is not hard to see that {Qt}∞t=1 is a
multidimensional irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain with a countable state space
S = NNxk . We first note the following rather intuitive condition for the existence of
a stationary distribution of {Qt}∞t=1, which follows from the argument in [66] for a
homogeneous system.
Lemma IV.1. The stationary distribution on channel k exists if and only if τ(1 −
τ)Nxk−1 > λk.
Hence, a symmetric arrival rate λ is stabilizable if there exists a population state
such that the above stability condition holds for all channels. Formally, let Xk(λ) =
[0, 1
N
log1−τ
αkλ
τ
+ 1
N
), and let X(λ) =
∏K
k=1Xk(λ). The set of stabilizable symmetric
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arrival rates is then given by ΛN = {λ > 0 : X(λ)∩X 6= ∅}. Recall that a throughput
optimal strategy, if it exists, generates a stability region that is the superset of that
of any other strategy. In our setup, the throughput optimal strategy trivially exists,
and for any stabilizable λ, its allocation can be defined as any population state that
stabilizes the network. ΛN is therefore the stability region of a throughput optimal
policy in our setup.
Using the above result, we can immediately obtain a throughput optimal policy
in an “almost explicit” form as follows. If λ ∈ Λ, it is then necessary that
K∑
k=1
1
N
log1−τ
αkλ
τ
+
K
N
≤ 1,
and xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆK) with
xˆk =
1
N
log1−τ
αkλ
τ
+ 1
N∑K
k=1
1
N
log1−τ
αkλ
τ
+ K
N
=
log1−τ αk + C(λ, τ)∑K
k=1 log1−τ αk +KC(λ, τ)
where C(λ, τ) = log1−τ
λ
τ
is always in X(λ) for a given λ. Then, for a sufficiently large
N , a neighboring point of xˆ on the grid X can represent the population state of a
throughput optimal policy for a stabilizable λ. As xˆ suggests, the throughput optimal
policy achieves certain form of load balance among different channels. In particular,
a channel with higher bandwidth, represented by a smaller αk, will be assigned more
users to leverage the resource. For the special case with physically symmetric chan-
nels, αk is identical for all k, and the allocation policy evenly distributes users on all
channels.
Beyond the above observation, Lemma IV.1 also provides a somehow implicit char-
acterization of a throughput optimal policy, which will prove to be more useful for
decentralized implementation, via an optimization problem. Specifically, a through-
put optimal policy can also be given as one that solves the following optimization
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problem for any given λ:
min
x∈XN
max
k∈[K]
αk
(1− τ)Nxk , (4.1)
and λ ∈ ΛN if and only if the value of the above problem is no less than τ(1−τ)λ .
There are two interesting features of this minimax optimization formulation. We first
observe that its solutions exhibit load balancing as the previous explicit solution.
That is, there always exists a monotone optimal solution x∗ to problem (4.1), such
that x∗k ≥ x∗j whenever αk ≤ αj. Also, note that (1− τ)Nxk−1 is the probability that
a transmission results in a collision when attempted, and the equivalent objective
αk
(1−τ)Nxk−1
of problem (4.1) physically represents the mean time that a node spends
in collision in the entire service process of a packet. In other words, the objective is
an indicator of local congestion level.
In the next part, we shall consider the decentralized implementation of a through-
put optimal policy in the large population regime, based on the above features given
by the formulation in (4.1). We shall consider certain scaling w.r.t. N . To obtain
meaningful results, we assume τ = C1
N
and λ = C2
N
for some positive constants C1 and
C2. That is, the network would maintain a constant total arrival rate and the total
number of transmission attempt is bounded on average.
4.2.2 Decentralized implementation via individual learning
The general strategy of our decentralized implementation is to realize a through-
put optimal policy via incentive based learning by users, as users dynamically select
channels to use. Our formulation and theoretical framework follows that of [67]. We
first define a population game among the users, which is identified by a payoff func-
tion that specifies the utilities derived by users in each channel, given any population
state. We then define the learning algorithm, or the so-called revision protocol [67],
which describes a updating procedure followed by the user in making channel se-
lections. The population game together with the learning algorithm then induces a
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deterministic and dynamic evolution in the mean change of the population state. A
recurrent/stable point in this process under a large population regime, if exists, can
be closely connected to the game theoretical equilibrium concept of the underlying
population game. We then further establish the connection between the equilibrium
point and a throughput optimal allocation policy.
An N -user population game with strategy space [K] (the set of all channels)1 is
given by a payoff function FN : XN → RK , where FNk (x) is the payoff to any user
selecting channel k when the population state is x ∈ XN . In light of problem (4.1),
we define
FNk (x) = −
αk
(1 − τ)Nxk .
Recall the scaling τ = C1
N
and assume C1 = 1 for simplicity in presentation. We define
a continuous population game by F : ∆K → RK , which is given by
Fk(x) = −αkexk ,
and is Lipschitz continuous. The sequence of finite population games {FN}∞N=N0 then
converges uniformly to F , where the constant N0 > 1.
We group time slots in each channel into epochs; an epoch on channel k consists
of L
αk
slots, where L is a constant and we assume L
αk
to be an integer for all k
so that the boundaries of epochs are aligned across channels.2 At the boundary
of an epoch, each user can update its choice of channel with probability 1
N
, and
the update opportunities are statistically independent among users. When a public
randomization device is available, alternatively one user can be randomly chosen from
the population with equal probability to update. The following analysis and results
also hold for this setup. The rationale is to have a bounded number of updates on
1Recall the notation [K] := {1, 2, . . . ,K}
2One can also assume that L is in addition chosen to be sufficient large, so that the payoff as the
average time in collision given a population state would be reasonably measured/observed by the
user as a mean-field effect. See the next chapter on the mean-field qualifier.
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average in each epoch that does not scale w.r.t. N , and the number of updates on a
channel is proportional to the local population size. Define the learning algorithm or
the revision protocol as a continuous function ρ : RK × ∆K → RK×K that specifies
the conditional switching probability ρkj(F
N(x), x) from channel k to channel j when
the population state is x and the payoff vector is given by FN(x). One can show that
the images of all FNk and F can be contained in some common compact set K when
N > 1. In the rest of this section, we will restrict the domain of ρ to K × ∆. As a
result ρ is uniformly continuous.
Given FN and ρ, it is not hard to see that they induce a Markov chain {XNℓ }∞ℓ=0
on the finite state space XN , where XNℓ is the population state at the beginning of the
ℓ-th epoch. Let {ξN,xk,i , k ∈ [K], i ∈ [Nxk]} be a collection of i.i.d. random variables
with
P(ξN,xk,i = z) =

1
N
· ρkj(FN(x), x), if z = 1N (ej − ek)
0, o.w.
where ek is the natural coordinate vector with a one in the k-th entry, and 0 the zero
vector of an appropriate size. ξN,xk,i then denotes the individual contribution to the
change in the population state over an epoch by user i on channel k, when the current
population state is x. In our setup, each epoch on a channel has duration of L time
units. We next consider a conceptual time scaling by letting each time unit be 1
LN
of a “primitive” time metric, so that an epoch has a duration of 1
N
in this metric.
The primitive time metric can be considered as relative to an outside observer of
the system, that is, as the population increases, we shall observe the evolution with
accelerated motion. It follows that the expected change per unit of primitive time
metric of {XNℓ }∞ℓ=0 is given by
V N(x) = NE[XNℓ+1 −XNℓ |XNℓ = x] = NE
[
K∑
k=1
Nxk∑
i=1
ξN,xk,i
]
49
=K∑
k=1
K∑
j=1
xkρkj(F
N(x), x)(ej − ek),
or for each entry,
V Nk (x) =
K∑
j=1
xjρjk(F
N(x), x)− xk.
Define the mean dynamics induced by the continuous population game, denoted by
V : ∆K → RK , as
Vk(x) =
K∑
j=1
xjρjk(F (x), x)− xk.
V N then converges to V uniformly given the uniform convergence of FN to F and
the uniform continuity of ρ. Consider the dynamic system
x˙ = V (x).
Let Sx be the set of all solutions with initial condition x(0) = x. Given a solution
{x(t)}t≥0, define the limit set of {x(t)} by
ω({x(t)}) =
⋂
τ≥0
cl({x(t)}t≥τ ),
where cl denotes the closure. Define the limit of set of a point x aby
ω(x) =
⋃
{x(t)}∈Sx
ω({x(t)}),
and the Birkhoff center of the dynamic system is then defined by
BC(V ) = cl({x ∈ ∆K : x ∈ ω(x)}).
We next state a result, which is Theorem 3.5 of [68] in our context3, and it shows
3the applicability of this theorem can be verified as in Example 4.1 and 4.2 in [68]. Also see
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the Markov chain {XNℓ }∞ℓ=0 is statistically concentrated on the Birkhoff center of the
deterministic dynamic system in the large population regime.
Theorem IV.2. Let µN be an invariant measure of the Markov chain {XNℓ }∞ℓ=0, and
let O be any open set containing BC(V ). Then, limN→∞ µ
N(O) = 1.
This result provides a guideline on decentralized implementation of throughput
optimal policies: a decentralized implementation would be realized if by appropriately
choosing the learning algorithm, thus the system dynamics V , the Birkhoff center
BC(V ) can be contained in the set of throughput optimal allocations. We shall show
in the following that this is indeed feasible. BC(V ) can be a singleton given by the
unique NE of the population game F , which interestingly is a throughput optimal
allocation in the large population regime, as it is a solution to the following limit form
of problem (4.1),
min
x∈∆K
max
k∈[K]
αke
xk . (4.2)
Definition IV.3. For a continuous population game F , x is a NE if xk > 0 implies
Fk(x) ≥ Fj(x) for all j ∈ [K].
Lemma IV.4. The NE of the continuous population game F with Fk(x) = −αkexk
is given by the solution to
min
x∈∆K
K∑
k=1
αke
xk (4.3)
Proof. This result is immediate by observing that F is a potential game with a concave
potential function f = −∑Kk=1 αkexk , and hence its NE is unique and is given by the
maximizer of the potential function.
Lemma IV.5. Let x∗ be the optimal solution to problem (4.3). Then it is also an
optimal solution to problem (4.2).
Chapter 12 in [67] for a text on the same topic.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that α1 ≤ α2 ≤ · · · ≤ αK . Let xˆ∗ be an
optimal solution to (4.2). We consider two cases.
Case 1. If
min
x∈∆K−1
max
k∈[K−1]
αke
xk ≤ αK ,
then
min
x∈∆K
max
k∈[K]
αke
xk ≤ αK .
Thus, xˆ∗K = 0; otherwise, maxk∈[K]αke
xˆ∗
k ≥ αKexˆ∗K > αK . We then claim x∗K = 0.
Indeed, if x∗K > 0, the KKT conditions for the convex program (4.3) implies αke
x∗
k is
a constant for all k. Hence,
∑K
k=1 αke
x∗
k > KαK . On the other hand,
∑K
k=1 αke
xˆ∗
k ≤
KαK , which is a contradiction. Given x
∗
K = 0, using again the KKT conditions, we
have αke
x∗
k ≤ αK , and thus
max
k∈[K]
αke
x∗
k = αK = max
k∈[K]
αke
xˆ∗
k .
Case 2. If
min
x∈∆K−1
max
k∈[K−1]
αke
xk > αK ,
it is not hard to see that xˆ∗k > 0 and αke
xˆ∗
k is a constant for all k. On the other
hand, the strong duality holds for (4.3), and xˆ satisfies the KKT conditions. Hence,
xˆ∗ = x∗.
Given the above results, the remaining question is on the choice of the learning
algorithm or the revision protocol ρ, so as to satisfy our assumption on ρ and induce
a dynamic system identified by V with BC(V ) being the unique NE.
Toward that end, we note there are a number of ways to choose ρ depending on the
information available to each user on the population state after each epoch, and the
same class of system dynamics can be induce by a family of learning algorithms. Also,
typical classes of system dynamics also tend to share a number of similar features,
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thus greatly expanding the domain of applications. A detailed exhibition of this topic
can be found in [67]. Below we show one example. Assume the users can observe the
population state at the end of each epoch. Consider then the pairwise comparison
rule, which is given by
ρkj(y, x) =

[yk−yj ]+
R
, if j 6= k
1−∑Kℓ=1 [yk−yℓ]+R , if j = k
where R is a constant such that R ≥ supy∈K
∑
k∈[K] yk. That is, the probability
of switching to a different channel is proportional to the excess payoff that can be
derived from switching. Since F is a potential game, following Theorem 7.1.2 in [67]
we conclude that BC(V ) is given by the unique NE of F .
4.3 Concluding Remarks: Hope and Challenge
The preceding analysis provides us with a few interesting conjectures on what we
should expect when we perform a similar analysis on DCF.
1. We have analyzed the decentralized implementation of the static throughput
optimal policy in the simplified setup, whereby via individual learning and ad-
justment, the population state converges to the static load balance in the long
run, which is also throughput optimal in one shot. The nature of this implemen-
tation as a multi-stage interaction among nodes in fact gives arise to dynamic
channel switching policies, and in that context throughput optimality can and
should be considered in the bigger space of dynamic policies. As measured
by the individual/total throughput, dynamic load balancing outperforms its
static counterpart; this is easily seen from the convexity of the individual/total
throughput in the population state. One would then expect that a dynamic
throughput optimal policy should be such that it achieves load balance on av-
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erage while avoiding completely idle channels.
2. Decentralized implementation of throughput optimal polices was shown to be
feasible in this simple model. This implementation features the collision rate
or in general the congestion level as an individual measure of utility from using
a channel, which seems both intuitive and promising in terms of engineering
practice. Indeed, local congestion level on a channel usually can be easily esti-
mated by users residing in that channel. However, a key component of this type
of implementation is the learning algorithm or revision protocol (including the
pairwise comparison rule shown as an example), which typically requires cer-
tain global information4 such as the population size and the population state,
to infer the global congestion level or other payoff related quantities. Such
global information is typically incomplete or entirely unavailable in real time to
individual nodes without centralized knowledge sharing or excessive overhead
due to massive message exchange. On the other hand, it is possible that load
balance may be achieved using symmetric randomization among nodes without
such global information. This motivates a decentralized implementation in an
even simpler form that we shall discuss in the next Chapter.
4The family of imitative protocol [67] can solely rely on local information, but they suffer from
the problem of extinction and the induced dynamics would have a much bigger Birkhoff center than
the singleton NE. See Chapters 4, 5 and 7 in [67] for a detailed discussion.
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CHAPTER V
Throughput Optimal Channel Switching in
Random Access - Part II: IEEE 802.11 WLANs
In this chapter, we shall build a complete model to analyze the DCF protocol
incorporating the heterogeneity in traffic loads among users. Using the Aloha based
simplification in the last chapter, we observed the throughput optimal channel alloca-
tion policy exhibits the rule-of-thumb principle of load balancing and that decentral-
ized implementation may be feasible using the local congestion level as an indicator
of payoff of using a channel. These lessons will turn out to be pivotal in interpreting
key results we shall derive for DCF, which inherits the essence from the slotted Aloha.
A summary of notation used throughout this chapter can be found in Appendix D.
5.1 802.11 DCF Backoff Mechanism
Compared to the slotted Aloha, instead of using coin toss to determine whether
a transmission should be attempted, the 802.11 DCF utilizes a process called backoff
to further reduce potential collision. The underlying system is still slotted, however
with heterogeneous slot lengths, which will be discussed at length in Section 5.2.
Also, all transmission attempts are aligned with slot edges, as we have seen in the
model of slotted Aloha. The channel is modeled as a collision channel with feedback,
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and all nodes can observe the state of the channel that can either be busy or idle.
The medium is idle if no node is transmitting and busy otherwise. Each idle slot is
of a fixed length, say 20µs in the 802.11b specification, and the length of a busy slot
depends on the packet length and whether it is a successful transmission or a collision.
To initiate a transmission, a node initializes a counter, called backoff counter, with
the value randomly generated from 0 toW0−1. The backoff counter decrements once
during each idle slot, and this process freezes if the channel is busy and resumes when
it is idle again. When the counter reaches zero, the node starts transmission, and a
collision occurs if there are two or more simultaneous attempts. Retransmissions are
then performed with the same backoff process but a larger window, say W1, to set
the backoff counter, hoping to reduce the likelihood of a second collision. Particu-
larly, Wj = 2
min (j,m)W0 where m is the maximum number of backoff stages, and this
scheme is commonly known as the binary exponential backoff. After M unsuccess-
ful retransmissions where M ≥ m, the packet is discarded. Here we introduced an
even simplified version of 802.11 DCF in the sense that all packets are assumed to
experience the backoff process and the so-called post-backoff feature is omitted due
to negligible impact on performance measures.
5.2 Problem Formulation
Consider a multiple access system using the IEEE 802.11 DCF (see Section 4.1 for
a brief account on DCF. There are N users, indexed by the set [N ] = {1, 2, . . . , N},
each with an infinite buffer, one transceiver (i.e., a single wireless interface) and uses
the same parameterization. We assume the channel is ideal and there is no MAC-
level packet discard, i.e., there is no retransmission limit of a packet after collision.
Throughout the analysis we also adopt a few other simplifying assumptions to make
the problem tractable; these will be stated in the context to which they apply. We
later show that these simplifications do not impact the accuracy of the model under
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normal operating parameter values.
The key to our method is to model the queue at each node with a service process
defined by 802.11 DCF as a slotted mean field Markov chain [69]. A “mean-field”
model approximates the effect of all the other players on any given one by a single
averaged effect, when studying a large number of interacting players, and each indi-
vidual has only a marginal impact on the overall population. Note that this idea is
consistent with the continuous population game in the slotted Aloha simplification
that we have seen in the last chapter. We first define the notion of slot.
Definition V.1. A virtual backoff timer of the system (or of a virtual node) is a
universal timer for all nodes in the system: it counts down indefinitely, alternating
between the count-down mode (when nodes in the system are counting down) and
the freezing mode (when some node in the system is transmitting). A slot is the time
period between two successive decrements of the virtual backoff timer.
Remark V.2. The above definition provides a universal slot time for all nodes in the
system, and we shall assume that the real backoff timer at each node is synchronized
to this virtual timer on slot boundaries. The motivation behind such a construction
originates from the principal difficulty in modeling a non-saturated system: the service
process at each node runs in embedded time in terms of a slot, which is in general
a random variable, whereas the packet arrival process is more naturally described in
real time [69]. This difficulty does not exist in saturated analysis, see e.g., [45], where
arrival processes do not play a role.
We further introduce three key assumptions in our model, followed by a discussion
on their implications and limitations.
Assumption V.3.
(A1) The MAC layer arrival process at node i is Poisson with rate λi bits per second.
(A2) (i) The service time of a packet, i.e. the time from the initial backoff to
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successful transmission, is exponential with service rate µi at node i, and
independent of all arrival processes.
(ii) Given the vector of arrival rates (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN) at all nodes, the vector of
service rates (µ1, µ2, . . . , µN) takes values from a set given by a correspon-
dence mapping from the arrival rate vector, i.e., there exists a correspon-
dence µ such that (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN)
µ7→ {(µ1, µ2, . . . , µN)}. Each service rate
vector will represent a state of the system given the same incoming traffic
load.
(A3) Let S(t) be the counting process of the number of slots accumulated up to time
t and let Qi(t) be the number of packets in the MAC queue of node i at time t.
1
S(t) is assumed to be independent of Qi(t) and renewal.
The above simplifying assumptions are not entirely realistic. Typically, due to
congestion control by upper-layer protocols, e.g., TCP, the arrival process to the
MAC layer is neither Poisson nor independent of the service process. However, as
our objective is to explore the inherent properties of 802.11 DCF, the independence
assumption is adopted to decouple the MAC layer from upper layers, while the Poisson
and exponential assumptions are adopted to avoid technicalities that can obscure the
main insight. Note that under the mean field methodology, each node is analyzed
in isolation from the activities of all other nodes which are collectively regarded as
an aggregate stationary process. Within such a framework the packet service time is
taken to be stationary (see e.g., Bianchi’s well-known mean field Markovian model of
the service process [45]).
With A1 and A2, each Qi(t) is then a well-defined M/M/1 queue for any given
pair of (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN) and (µ1, µ2, . . . , µN), and each queue is stable if and only if
Qi(t) is positive recurrent. Equivalently we may consider the utilization factor ρi
1As to our notation convention in this chapter, we shall use letters in boldface to denote vector-
valued quantities explicitly, and we place time indices as arguments for random processes.
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at node i, given by ρi = min{λiµi , 1}: the queue is stable if and only if ρi < 1. Let
λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN), and we then formally define the stability region of system as
follows.
Definition V.4. The system is stable given λ if all user queues are stable for all
(µ1, µ2, . . . , µN) ∈ µ(λ) determined by the DCF scheme. The stability region Λ is the
set of all λ ∈ RN+ such that the system is stable.
If Qi(t) is positive recurrent, then it is ergodic and we have limt→∞ P (Qi(t) >
0) = 1− πi(0) = ρi, where {πi(u)}∞u=0 is the stationary distribution of Qi(t). If Qi(t)
is transient or null recurrent, in which case ρi = 1, we have limt→∞ P (Qi(t) = 0) =
0 = 1− ρi. Therefore, ρi is asymptotically given by limt→∞ P (Qi(t) > 0) in all cases
in our model.
For technical reasons we shall also consider the embedded queueing process Qˆi(n),
n = 1, 2, · · · , defined by Qˆi(n) := Qi(Tn), where Tn is the time of the n-th slot
boundary. Qˆi(n) is thus a discrete-time process constructed by observing Qi(t) at
slot boundaries. For an arbitrary process S(t), Qˆi(n) is not necessarily Markovian.
However, given assumption A3, durations between slot boundaries are i.i.d., consti-
tuting sampling periods that are independent of Qi(t). Hence Qˆi(t) is a discrete-time
Markov chain under our assumption. It’s worth noting that A3 does not exactly hold
in reality because the slot length is a function of a node’s activity, and thus the state
of its queue, even with the mean field simplification of other nodes’ behavior (this is
more precisely shown in the appendix). However, this dependence weakens when the
number of nodes or the backoff window size is sufficiently large. We empirically show
that this assumption does not impact the accuracy of prediction even with a small
node population and backoff window size.
Let ρˆi denote the utilization factor under the discrete-time system Qˆi(n). In
general ρˆi 6= ρi. Indeed we show in Appendix C that ρˆi ≤ ρi where equality holds if
and only if ρi = 1 or ρi = 0, i.e., node i is either saturated or idle. Similar to ρi, ρˆi is
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asymptotically given by limn→∞ P (Qˆi(n) > 0).
We shall adopt Bianchi’s decoupling approximation [45] as another key assump-
tion, stated as follows. Define Ci(j) := 1 if the j-th attempt by node i results in a
collision, and Ci(j) := 0 if it results in a success.
Assumption V.5.
(A4) [Bianchi’s Decoupling Approximation] For each node i ∈ [N ], the collision se-
quence {Ci(j)} is i.i.d. with P (Ci(j) = 1) = pi for some constant pi.
In reality successive attempts by the same node may occur if it repeatedly selects
timer value 0 while other nodes’ timers remain frozen. In such cases the above as-
sumption ceases to hold. This phenomenon can be prominent when the window size
is small, and has been taken into account in some recent work [70]. In this study
we shall ignore the possibility of successive attempts for simplicity of presentation
and adopt A4. (A more precise model is possible by imposing independence not on
all attempts but only the first attempt in each such sequence.) This is reasonable
when the initial window size is sufficiently large. Our empirical results are fairly close
between with and without consideration of successive attempts for large backoff win-
dows. For small backoff windows, the discrepancy between the two will be illustrated
in the numerical results.
Define respectively N si and N
tx
i as the numbers of slots and transmission attempts
that node i takes in serving one packet. W i :=
ENsi
ENtxi
is referred to as the average size
of backoff window of node i.
Using Bianchi’s approximation, we have
EN si =
∞∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
2min{j,m}W + 1
2
(pi)
k(1− pi)
=
∞∑
j=0
2min{j,m}W + 1
2
( ∞∑
k=j
(pi)
k(1− pi)
)
60
=
∞∑
j=0
2min{j,m}W + 1
2
(pi)
j
where W is the size of the initial backoff window and m is the value of the maximum
backoff stage. Also note EN txi =
1
1−pi
. Therefore, W i is given by
W i =
1
2
[
W
(
(1− pi)
m−1∑
j=0
(2pi)
j + (2pi)
m
)
+ 1
]
.
We next derive a relationship between the transmission attempt probability and
ρˆi. Let τi(n) be the probability that node i initiates a transmission attempt in the
n-th slot.
Lemma V.6. τi := limn→∞ τi(n) exists and is given by τi = ρˆi/W i.
Proof. Denote by Tx(n) the event that node i initiates an attempt in the n-th slot.
Then
τi(n) = P (Tx(n)|Qˆi(n) > 0) · P (Qˆi(n) > 0)+
+ P (Tx(n)|Qˆi(n) = 0) · P (Qˆi(n) = 0).
Consider now the sequence of slots in which node i has a packet in service. Given the
decoupling among nodes, the occurrences of slots in which node i starts the service
for a packet thus form renewal events. Regarding each transmission attempt as one
unit of reward and using the renewal reward theory, we then obtain
lim
n→∞
P (Tx(n)|Qˆi(n) > 0) = EN
tx
i
EN si
=
1
W i
.
Since limn→∞ P (Qˆi(n) > 0) = ρˆi, and P (Tx(n)|Qˆi(n) = 0) = 0, the result follows.
To put the above result in context, one easily verifies that in the extreme case
61
where all nodes are saturated and identical, we have ρˆi = ρi = ρ = 1 and pi = p for
all i. Consequently,
τi = τ =
2
W
(
(1− p)∑m−1j=0 (2p)j + (2p)m)+ 1
=
2(1− 2p)
(1− 2p)(W + 1) + pW (1− (2p)m) ,
which is exactly the same as obtained in [45] equation (7).
5.3 Single Channel Stability Region
5.3.1 The Stability Region Equation Σ
Our first main result is the following theorem on the quantitative description of
Λ. Let ESi,Q,Tx denote the conditional average length of a slot given that the queue
at node i is non-empty but i does not transmit in this slot. Ts and Tc denote the time
duration of a successful transmission and a collision, respectively.
Theorem V.7. λ ∈ Λ if and only if for any solution τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τN) ∈ [0, 1]N to
the following system of equations Σ given λ,
Σ :

τi =
ρˆi
W i
, ∀i (a)
pi = 1−
∏
j 6=i
(1− τj), ∀i (b)
ρi = min
{
λi
P
(
W i − 1
1− pi ESi,Q,Tx + Tc
pi
1− pi + Ts
)
, 1
}
, ∀i (c)
where P is the packet payload size, we have 0 ≤ ρi < 1 for all i ∈ [N ]. Let
C :
{
0 ≤ τi ≤ 1, ∀i (i)
0 ≤ ρi < 1, ∀i (ii)
We shall denote this constrained system of equations by (Σ,C,λ).
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Proof. Σ(a) is the result of Lemma V.6, and Σ(b) is an immediate consequence of
the definition of pi. Let the average service time at node i be X i seconds per bit; the
average service time per packet is thus PXi. Define Y i(j) as
Y i(j) = Tc +
(
2min{j,m}W + 1
2
− 1
)
ESi,Q,Tx.
Physically, Y i(j) is the average time between the beginning of the j-th transmission
attempt, which results in a collision, and the beginning of the (j + 1)-th attempt,
given that node i encounters at least j collisions before completing the service of some
packet. Since the collision sequence is geometric, we have
PXi =
∞∑
k=0
[(
W + 1
2
− 1
)
ESi,Q,Tx +
k∑
j=1
Y i(j) + Ts
]
× (pi)k(1− pi)
=
∞∑
j=1
∞∑
k=j
Y i(j)(pi)
k(1− pi) +
(
W + 1
2
− 1
)
× ESi,Q,Tx + Ts
=
∞∑
j=1
(pi)
jY i(j) +
(
W + 1
2
− 1
)
ESi,Q,Tx + Ts.
Therefore,
PX i =
∞∑
j=1
[
(pi)
j
(
Tc +
(
2min{j,m}W + 1
2
− 1
)
× ESi,Q,Tx
)]
+
+
(
W + 1
2
− 1
)
ESi,Q,Tx + Ts
=
∞∑
j=0
[
2min{j,m}W − 1
2
(pi)
j
]
ESi,Q,Tx + Tc
∞∑
j=1
(pi)
j + Ts
=
W i − 1
1− pi ESi,Q,Tx + Tc
pi
1− pi + Ts.
Note that τi < 1 for all i, and we have pi < 1 for all i as a result. In addition, ESi,Q,Tx
is finite (computed in the appendix). Hence we conclude that the packet service time
is finite. Thus, the utilization factor of node i is given by ρi = min{λiX i, 1} and
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Σ(c) follows, and C(i) is for the validity of τ as a probability measure. (Σ, C(i), λ)
then constitutes a full description on the system utilization. C(ii) is the necessary
and sufficient condition for stability as commented in the previous section.
For a given set of system parameter values, two sets of quantities are needed to
compute Σ: ESi,Q,Tx and ρˆi, ∀i ∈ N . These are computed in Appendix C, respec-
tively. In particular, in Appendix C we show that though it is analytically intractable,
ρˆi is well approximated by
ρˆi ≈
ρiESi,Q
ρiESi,Q + (1− ρi)E[Si,Q]
,
where ESi,Q (resp. ESi,Q) is the conditional average length of a slot given that the
queue at node i is non-empty (resp. empty) at the beginning of this slot.
5.3.2 Characterizing the Solutions to Σ
Without the stability constraint C(ii), (Σ, C(i), λ) can be rewritten as a vector-
valued fixed point equation τ = Γ(τ ) over [0, 1]N , where τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τN), and the
existence of solutions can be shown by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Hence, the
condition in Theore V.7 is not vacuous. However, the uniqueness of its solution is in
general difficult to prove; nevertheless, under the condition of a sufficiently large initial
backoff window W , we have the following result on the uniqueness of its solution.
With a large initial backoff window W , the probability of collision is small, so
we have W i ≈ W+12 . We also observe that ESi,Q ≈ ESi,Q when W is large (cf.
Appendix C). Consequently, we can approximate ρˆi by ρi. Also, using the first-
order Taylor approximation, we have
∏
j 6=i
1
1−τj
≈ 1 +∑j 6=i τj for small τ . Note that
the minimization operator in Σ is redundant when combined with C(ii). Hence, let
Ts = Tc = T for simplicity of presentation, and (Σ,C,λ) can be then approximated
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by the following constrained system of equations,
Σ˜ :

τi =
ρi
W+1
2
, ∀i (a)
ρi =
λi
P
[
W − 1
2
(
σ + T
∑
j 6=i
τi
)
+ T
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
τi
)]
, ∀i (b)
subject to the same set of constraints.
Proposition V.8. (Σ˜,λ) admits a unique solution.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark V.9. 1) The above result suggests that Σ has a unique solution when W ,
the initial window size, is sufficient large. As an approximation we shall take this
condition to be equivalent to a large average backoff window. This is because the
probability of a (first-attempt) collision decays inverse-linearly in W , and thus W i is
dominated by W when W is sufficiently large. In this case, the correspondence (µ),
which is implicitly given by Σ, reduces to a vector-valued function.
2) As we shall see numerically in the next section, multiple fixed point solutions
may arise when W is small; this will be referred to as multi-equilibrium (as op-
posed to “multistable” or “metastable” [69] to avoid confusion). As to the nature
of multiplicity of solutions, consider the two-user scenario with symmetric load and
attempt rate. The number of packets that can delivered in a slot is then given by
2τ(1− τ) = 2 ρˆ
W
(1− ρˆ
W
), which can be mapped to the deliverable amount of data per
unit of time given the average scaling of a slot. Since ρˆ ∈ [0, 1], we have τ ∈ [0, 1
W
],
i.e., loosely speaking, the size of backoff window controls the effective range of τ .
When W is large, the function 2τ(1 − τ) exhibits monotonicity, while for small val-
ues of W , for given 2τ(1 − τ) measured by an outside observer, there can exist two
different states of the system utilization, thus the multi-equilibrium phenomenon. As
we shall see, this upper-bounding effect of backoff window size on the attempt rate
will continue to play a key role in interpreting other results.
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In the proof of Proposition V.8, we in fact obtained the approximated unique
solution to (Σ,λ). Therefore, by imposing feasibility constraints C, we can induce
a simplified version of (Σ,C,λ), which is an approximation to Λ and is easier to
compute.
Corollary V.10. When W is sufficiently large, Λ is approximated by
Λ˜ =
{
λ ∈ RN+
∣∣∣∣ 0 < γ1i (λi)
∑
j γ
2
j (λi)
1−∑i γ1j (λi) + γ2i (λi) < 2W + 1 , ∀i
}
where γ1i (λi) =
λiT
P
/(
1 + λiT
P
)
, and γ2i (λi) =
λi((W−1)σ+2T )
P (W+1)
/(
1 + λiT
P
)
.
5.4 Numerical Results: Single Channel
Using (Σ,C,λ), we can quantitatively describe the stability region of a single
channel system, and some numerical results for the two-user case are illustrated in this
section. The parameters used in both the numerical computation and the simulation
are reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. Under the basic access mechanism of DCF
we have 
Ts =
P
Tx. Rate
+Header + ACK +DIFS + SIFS + 2δ
Tc =
P
Tx. Rate
+Header + DIFS + δ
where δ is the propagation delay.
5.4.1 Multi-equilibrium and Discontinuity in ρ
We first illustrate the existence of multi-equilibrium solutions and discontinuity of
ρi(λ) in λ; this is shown in Figure 5.1. We fix the value of λ2 and increase λ1 from 0
to 4.5 Mbps. For each pair λ = (λ1, λ2), we solve for the fixed point(s) of Σ with the
same set of initial values of τi and ρˆi for i ∈ [N ] to which we refer as a set of initial
conditions (ICs). We then convert the results to ρ = (ρi, i ∈ [N ]) using Eqn. Σ(c).
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Figure 5.1: Solution components for various scenarios: an illustration.
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The collection of the pairs (λ,ρ(λ)) then constitutes a solution component for this
set of ICs. Note that this is obtained by solving (Σ, C(i), λ) without considering the
stability constraint C(ii). We repeat the above computation for different sets of ICs
under the same system parameters including W and m. The entire process is then
repeated for different pairs (W , m). For each pair (W , m), the resulting solution
components constitute an overall correspondence between the vectors λ and ρ(λ),
and this is plotted for ρ1 vs. λ1 in Figure 5.1.
In the first scenario as shown in Figure 5.1(a), where the initial window is of the
smallest possible size for two users and window expansion is disallowed (m = 0), three
different zones of the correspondence ρ1(λ1) are present, labeled as A, A
′ and B in
the figure. In zones A and A′, a single fixed point is admitted and ρ1(λ1) reduces to
a function, while in zone B we see two solutions. Along each solution component,
there is a jump in ρ1 in zone B as λ1 increases; this is essentially a phase transition
from stable to unstable regions. What this result illustrates is that depending on the
initial condition, certain input rates may or may not lead to a feasible solution (a
point that corresponds to stable queues). Thus when such multi-equilibrium exists,
we may have a collection of “stability regions” given different initial conditions, and
this phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 5.3 and discussed in the next subsection
in detail. Recall that under our definition of stability region and Theorem V.7, an
arrival rate vector is considered within the stability region if and only if any initial
condition induces so; the stability region thus defined is therefore the infimum of this
collection when multiple equilibria exist.
Intuitively, initial conditions with large values suggest a pessimistic prediction
on the system stability under λ, and it may thus result in a small Λ; by contrast,
ICs with small values render an optimistic one and a larger Λ. Empirically, we find
that the set of ICs with τi = ρi ≈ 1 for i ∈ [N ] results in the earliest jump in ρ1
and the one with τi = ρi = 0 for i ∈ [N ] gives the latest. Consequently, solution
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components resulting from these two sets of ICs define the boundary of zone B and
the corresponding “stability regions”, forming the empirical supremum and infimum
of the collection of “stability regions”.
Inspecting the set of figures Fig. 5.1(a)-5.1(d), we see that as the initial window
increases, the multi-equilibrium gradually vanishes and the gap in ρ1 caused by the
jump discontinuity closes.
5.4.2 Numerical and Empirical Stability Regions
We numerically solve (Σ,C,λ) with two nodes to obtain the corresponding Λ, and
then compare it with the simulated boundary. In simulation, for each fixed λ2, we
increase λ1 with a step size ∆λ, and compute the empirical throughput of node i
obtained under λ, denoted as Sλi , and the number of backlogged packets at node i by
the end of simulation, denoted as Bλi . The simulator declares a point λ unstable if
there exists at least one i such that Sλi < λi and B
λ
i P/(λiTf) > βi, by the simulation
time Tf , where βi is an instability threshold, 0 < βi < 1. In the experiment we set
∆λ = 0.1 Mbps (100 Kbps), Tf = 10 sec and βi = β = 1%. The stable point (λ1, λ2)
such that (λ1+∆λ, λ2) is unstable is declared a point on the simulated boundary; the
experiment is repeated for each λ2 and the empirical mean value of λ1 is recorded.
Due to symmetry, only half of the boundary points are evaluated. The results are
shown in Figure 5.2.
Our main observation is that when the initial (or average) backoff window is large,
the stability region is convex (Figure 5.2(a)). The convexity gradually disappears as
the window size decreases and the region is given by a near-linear boundary in Figure
5.2(b). It becomes clearly concave when the window size is small (Figure 5.2(c)).
Interestingly, the case of W = 32 is the most frequently studied in the literature, and
a linear boundary of the capacity region has been observed in [49]. As shown here, this
linear boundary is only a special case in a spectrum of convex-concave boundaries.
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Figure 5.2: The stability regions in various scenarios - part I.
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It is worth noting that in [50], Leith et al. established the general log-convexity of
the rate region of 802.11 WLANs. This implies that the rate region could be either
convex or concave, though [50] did not associate this with the window size as we have
explicitly done here. It also suggests that the rate region and the stability region may
be quite similar in nature; this however is not a formally proven statement, nor are
we aware of such in the case of 802.11.
The change in the shape of the stability region as W changes may be explained
as follows. Small W represents a highly aggressive configuration. This is much more
beneficial when there is a high degree of asymmetry between the users’ arrival rates.
This is reflected in the concave shape of the region. When W is large, users are non-
aggressive, which is more beneficial when arrival rates are similar, resulting in the
convex shape. Numerically, the W = 8 case gives the largest stability region. This
seems to suggest that the largest stability region is given by the smallest choice of W
such that a unique feasible solution to (Σ,C,λ) exists. It would be very interesting
to see if this could be established rigorously.
In Figure 5.3, we compute the stability regions of the case where W = 2 and
m = 0 for two different sets of ICs. As discussed earlier, when multi-equilibrium
exists we may have a collection of “stability regions”. This is clearly seen in Figure
5.3: three different zones A, A′ and B in the correspondence ρ1(λ1) are mapped
accordingly onto Λ. The boundary of stability region in our definition corresponds to
the innermost one. As noted in [69], the simulated boundary reflects time-averages
of multiple equilibria. Hence, our notion of stability region provides an estimation of
the inner bound of the empirical stability region in this case.
As mentioned earlier, for small backoff windows the occurrence of successive at-
tempts is non-trivial, which our model has ignored. The first-attempt decoupling
approximation mentioned after A4 captures the nodal behavior more accurately, and
the adaptation of Σ using this alternative assumption is detailed in [71]. In Fig-
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Figure 5.3: The stability regions in various scenarios - part II.
ure 5.3(b), we plot the counterpart of Figure 5.3(a) using the first-attempt decou-
pling approximation, and the discrepancy between results obtained using these two
assumptions does exists. This is most notably shown in the numerical boundary A.
The fact that the simulated boundary is now in between the two numerical boundaries
verifies that this alternative assumption is more accurate. We do note however that
for large windows this gap diminishes judging from numerical observation, which is
to be expected.
5.4.3 Discussion: From 802.11 DCF Back to Aloha
We next recall results on the stability region of slotted Aloha, the natural proto-
type of modern 802.11 DCF, and provide an intuitive argument on why the qualitative
properties of the stability region shown in the previous section are to be expected.
In [72], Massey and Mathys studied an information theoretical model of multi-
access channel which shares several fundamental features with slotted Aloha. They
investigated the Shannon capacity region of this channel with n users, which is shown
to be the following subset of Rn+:
C =
{
vect
(
τi
∏
j 6=i
(1− τj)
) ∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N},
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where vect(vi) = (v1, v2, . . . , vN), and τi is the transmission attempt rate of user i.
In [53], Anantharam showed that the closure of the stability region of slotted Aloha
is also given by C, under a geometrically distributed aggregate arrival process with
parameter 1/(
∑
i λi) and probability λi/
∑
j λj that such an arrival is at node i.
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Figure 5.4: The stability region of slotted ALOHA and induced subsets.
The above result on slotted Aloha can be used to explain the stability region
of 802.11 DCF. Note that the main difference between the two lies in the collision
avoidance mechanism. Instead of attempting transmission with probability 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1
in a slot under slotted Aloha, under DCF each user randomly chooses a backoff timer
value within a window. The effect the average backoff length W has on transmission
under DCF is akin to that of restricting the attempt rate τ within an upper bound
1
W
under slotted Aloha. Hence, the stability region of 802.11 DCF may be viewed as
a subset of C provided that we properly scale a slot to real time.
To verify this intuition, let CW be the subset of C when 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1W for all i. In
Figure 5.4, we plot C and CW with different values of W . We see that as W grows,
CW evolves from a concave set to a convex set, consistent with what we observed of
802.11 DCF in the previous subsection. It must be pointed out that this connection,
73
while intuitive, is not a precise one technically. For instance, this connection might
suggest that the stability region of 802.11 DCF will reduce to C when the average
backoff length is 1. This is however not true. In this trivial case, the stability region
of 802.11 DCF is reduced to one dimension, i.e., the system is unstable for N ≥ 2.
This is because the retransmission probability of DCF is also lower bounded by the
reciprocal of the window size at its backoff stage, and in the case when the backoff
length is one another collision occurs with certainty.
5.5 Multi-channel Analysis
Using a similar, mean-field Markovian model as we did in the single channel case,
we can show that the stability region of a multi-channel system under a certain
switching policy g is given by another system of equations denoted as (Σg,C,λ),
under the arrival rates λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN), and subject to the feasibility constraints
C; this is given later in the section. In addition to the same set of assumptions made
in the single channel model, we assume that the system has K channels, indexed by
the set [K] = {1, 2, . . . , K}.
The fundamental conceptual issue accompanying channelization is the notion of
a channel switching policy, either centralized or distributed, that introduces channel
occupancy and packet assignment distributions for each node. An additional technical
issue induced by channelization is the heterogeneity of embedded time units among
different channels. Since the slot length in a channel is by nature a random variable
that depends on random packet arrivals, channels are in general strongly asynchronous
in the embedded time units. Thus, as nodes switch among channels, we may need to
switch the corresponding reference of embedded time in the slot based analysis. We
therefore define the notion of a slot in different contexts as follows.
Definition V.11. Consider the virtual backoff timer defined earlier separately for
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a single channel. A channel-slot (c-slot) is defined as the time interval between two
consecutive decrements on this virtual timer for a given channel.
Definition V.12. Consider a virtual backoff timer at each node that counts down
indefinitely according to the node’s backoff state, and is synchronized to the virtual
timer of the channel in which the node resides and is done upon switching. A node-
slot (n-slot) is defined as the time interval between two consecutive decrements on a
given node’s virtual backoff timer.
Remark V.13. There is no inherent difference between the two types of slots. However,
this differentiation of time references becomes crucial when we define quantities based
on the random embedded time. This observation will be made more concrete in the
analysis. We shall also omit the explicit association of a channel (node) index with a
slot whenever it does not cause ambiguity.
A channel switching or scheduling policy g induces a number of distributions
related to Σg. Denote by Qni (j) = {q(k)i (j), k ∈ [K], where q(k)i (j) is the probability
that node i is on channel k at the beginning of its j-th n-slot. Qni (j) is referred to as
the the channel occupancy distribution in n-slots of node i in the j-th n-slot.
Denote by Qci(j) = {qˆ(k)i (j), k ∈ [K]}, where qˆ(k)i (j) is the probability that node i
is on channel k at the beginning of its j-th c-slot. Qci(j) is referred to as the channel
occupancy profile of node i at the j-th c-slot. Note that Qci(j) is not necessarily a
distribution and
∑
k∈[K] qˆ
(k)
i (j) need not be 1 for a given j.
Denote by Qpi (ℓ) = {q˜(k)i (ℓ), k ∈ [K]}, where q˜(k)i (ℓ) is the probability that the
ℓ-th packet of node i is served on channel k, and Qpi (ℓ) is referred to as the packet
assignment distribution of node i.
We have the following assumptions on policy g.
Assumption V.14.
(A5) Under g, Bianchi’s approximation is still satisfied.
75
(A6) g is independent of the binary state of the queue at any node (empty vs. non-
empty).
(A7) g is nonpreemptive in a channel for the entire service process of a packet; that
is, a channel-switching decision is only made before or after the service process
of a packet.
(A8) The corresponding steady state distribution of Qni (j), Qci(j) and Qpi (ℓ) exist
under g, denoted by Qni , Qci and Qpi , and they agree with the respective limits
as their respective arguments tend to infinity2
Similar as in single channel analysis, we impose the Markovian assumption on
the discrete-time queueing process Qˆ
(k)
i (n), which is the embedded process of Qi(t)
(queue state of node i) sampled at the boundaries of c-slots of channel k, and define
ρˆ
(k)
i = limn→∞ P (Qˆ
(k)
i (n) > 0). Also, let τ
(k)
i (n) be the probability that node i initiates
a transmission attempt in the n-th c-slot of channel k. We then have the following
lemma; its proof is similar to that of Lemma V.6 (based on A6 and A8) and omitted.
Lemma V.15. τ
(k)
i := limn→∞ τ
(k)
i (n) exists and is given by τ
(k)
i = qˆ
(k)
i ρˆ
(k)
i /W
(k)
i ,
where W
(k)
i :=
E[N
s,(k)
i ]
E[N
tx,(k)
i ]
is the average backoff window size of node i on channel k,
with N
s,(k)
i and N
tx,(k)
i defined in parallel as in the single channel case.
Remark V.16. Under A7, W
(k)
i is given by
W
(k)
i =
1
2
[
W
(
(1− p(k)i )
m−1∑
j=0
(2p
(k)
i )
j + (2p
(k)
i )
m
)
+ 1
]
,
where p
(k)
i is the probability of collision on channel k given a transmission attempt
and W is the initial backoff window size.
2These limiting quantities are related by well-define correspondences, which are detailed in [71],
and those relations are used to numerically evaluate the stability region equation for a multi-channel
system presented in this section.
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Given any scheduling policy g, let Λg be the corresponding stability region, and
we have the following theorem characterizing Λg.
Theorem V.17. λ ∈ Λg if and only if for any solution τ = (τ (k), k ∈ [K]) where
τ (k) = (τ
(k)
i , i ∈ [N ]) ∈ [0, 1]N to the following system of equations Σg given λ,
Σg :

τ
(k)
i =
qˆ
(k)
i ρˆ
(k)
i
W
(k)
i
, ∀i, k (a)
p
(k)
i = 1−
∏
j 6=i
(1− τ (k)j ), ∀i, k (b)
ρi = min
{
λi
P
∑
k∈[K]
[
q˜
(k)
i
(
W
(k)
i − 1
1− p(k)i
ES
(k)
i,Q,Tx
+ T (k)c
p
(k)
i
1− p(k)i
+ T (k)s
)]
, 1
}
,
∀i, k (c)
we have 0 ≤ ρi < 1 for all i ∈ [N ], where P is the packet payload size, and ES(k)i,Q,Tx
is the conditional average length of a c-slot on channel k given that the queue at node
i is non-empty but i does not transmit in this slot. Let
C :
0 ≤ τ
(k)
i ≤ 1, ∀i, k (i)
0 ≤ ρi < 1, ∀i (ii)
We shall denote this constrained system of equations by (Σg,C,λ).
Proof. The proof is an immediate extension of the proof of Theorem V.7, given as-
sumptions on g.
The existence of a solution to Σg can be similarly established using Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem. We next study its uniqueness and the throughput optimality of a
switching policy by resorting to an approximation given below, due to the complexity
of Σg. For the rest of this section, we shall limit our discussion to the symmetric
case where the channels have the same bandwidth and the system uses the same
parameterization in all channels. We extend our discussion to more generic settings
in the next section.
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Definition V.18. A scheduling policy is unbiased if the stationary channel occupancy
distribution induced by such a policy is identical for every node, i.e., q
(k)
i = q
(k) for
all i ∈ [N ] and k ∈ [K]. It is denoted by gU , and the space of unbiased policies is GU .
We can obtain an approximation to (Σg
U
,C,λ) similarly as we did for Σ, using
qˆ(k) ≈ q˜(k) ≈ q(k):
Σ˜g
U
:

τ
(k)
i =
q(k)ρi
W+1
2
(a)
ρi =
λi
P
∑
k∈[K]
{
q(k)
[
W − 1
2
(
σ + T
∑
j 6=i
τ
(k)
j
)
+ T
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
τ
(k)
j
)]}
(b)
and we have the following result.
Theorem V.19. Consider a system modeled by Σ˜g
U
and the associated stability region
Λg
U
. For all sufficiently large initial window sizes W , (i) the system of equations
(Σg
U
,λ) admits a unique solution, and (ii) gU is throughput optimal within the class
GU if q(k) = 1
K
for all k. These are referred to as equi-occupancy policies.
Proof. We omit the proof on uniqueness, which is similar to the single-channel case;
see Appendix C for the proof on throughput optimality.
The above results provide the following insights in addition to what we have
observed in the single-channel case. Firstly, it’s worth noting that Σg reduces to Σ
in the single-channel case by properly configuring related parameters, and Σg thus
constitutes a unified framework in describing the stability region of 802.11 DCF.
Secondly, the uniqueness of the solution to (Σg
U
,λ) is in fact true for even small
windows. As an example, in Figure 5.5, we plot the numerical boundaries of stability
regions for various window settings with equal channel occupancy. Compared to re-
sults in the single-channel case, convexity of the stability region is observed even with
small backoff windows in the two-channel case. Also, the numerical multi-equilibrium
phenomenon disappears in this case. One way to explain this is by considering the
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discounting effect of channelization on the attempt rate. The attempt rate of each
node in a channel is discounted by the occupancy probability in that channel. As
discussed in the single-channel case, the attempt rate is roughly upper bounded by
the reciprocal of the average backoff window size. Hence channelization has the effect
of window expansion. The same explanation also applies to the observation that the
stability region in a multi-channel system is nearly always convex.
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Figure 5.5: The stability region of two-channel 802.11 DCF under the equi-occupancy
policy.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
λ1 (Mbps)
λ
2
(M
b
p
s)
 
 
q(1) = 12
q(1) = 13
q(1) = 14
(a) W = 32,m = 5
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
λ1 (Mbps)
λ
2
(M
b
p
s)
 
 
q(1) = 12
q(1) = 13
q(1) = 14
(b) W = 128,m = 5
Figure 5.6: Throughput optimality of equi-occupancy distribution.
Thirdly, given symmetric channelization, equal occupancy time is equivalent to
equal packet assignment in each channel. The optimality of equi-occupancy policies
therefore confirms the intuitive notion that load balancing (either in the number of
active nodes or in the amount of date flow) optimizes the system performance in terms
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of expanding the stability region. In Figure 5.6, we plot the analytical boundaries of
stability regions corresponding to different unbiased policies in two scenarios. As can
been seen, the equi-occupancy policy results in a stability region that is the superset
of those of the other unbiased policies. It is also worth noting that as the backoff
window increases, the gap between the superset region and other inferior regions
decreases, as the reciprocal of the window size becomes the dominant factor in upper
bounding the attempt rate.
5.6 Applicability and Implementation of Unbiased Policies
in Both Symmetric and Asymmetric Systems
In this section we discuss the applicability of the class of unbiased policies. We
then present a number of practical implementations and their use in both symmetric
and asymmetric systems.
5.6.1 Unbiased Policies
We have so far restricted our policy space to unbiased policies that induce a node-
independent channel occupancy or packet assignment distribution. Note that while
nodes in the same system are typically programmed with the same protocol stack, the
same protocol may not necessarily yield the same statistical behavior among different
nodes. Nevertheless, there are a number of circumstances in which node-independent
behaviors are induced, which justifies our focus on unbiased policies. Firstly, if the
protocol explicitly prescribes packet allocation to each channel, the resulting packet
assignment distributions are identical for all nodes. Secondly, if nodes have identical
arrival processes, they then have unbiased behavior as well. Unbiasedness can also
be observed in a saturated network (however, such a system is unstable).
More generally, we note that when a node is active (i.e., its queue is non-empty and
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it is in the service process), from a mean-field point of view the channel conditions
observed by this node is fully characterized by p
(k)
i for each k (as a result of the
decoupling assumption), which is a function of τ
(k)
j for all j 6= i. Therefore, the set of
attempt rates {τ (k)i ; ∀i, ∀k} characterizes the contention condition in the system. If
nodes are asymptotically symmetric, that is, limN→∞ τ
(k)
i /τ
(k)
j = 1, for all i 6= j and
k, then we have
lim
N→∞
p
(k)
i
p
(k)
j
= lim
N→∞
1−∏l 6=i(1− τ (k)ℓ )
1−∏l 6=j(1− τ (k)ℓ ) = 1 + limN→∞
A(τ
(k)
j − τ (k)i )
Aτ
(k)
i + (1− A)
= 1,
where A =
∏
l 6=i,j(1− τ (k)ℓ ). In this case we may consider the behavior induced by the
underlying protocol on each node identical, and the corresponding policy unbiased.
Note that the decoupling assumption is regarded as asymptotically true for a large
number of nodes, so we may consider the asymptotic symmetry as an adjoint condition
if we impose the decoupling approximation in modeling.
5.6.2 Practical Implementation of Throughput Optimal Unbiased Poli-
cies: Symmetric Channels
We have shown that when channels are symmetric the optimal switching policy
within the class of unbiased policies is the equi-occupancy policy that balances load
precisely. When channels are asymmetric, i.e., have different bandwidths, it is natural
to expect that a load balancing policy yields throughput optimal performance, and
to interpret a balanced load as having a packet assignment distribution proportional
to the channel bandwidths. We shall see that this interpretation is reasonable though
not precise.
We begin by commenting on how such policies may be realized in a symmetric
system. We describe two very simple heuristics that implement an unbiased policy,
and in particular, the equi-occupancy policy when channels are symmetric. The
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description is given in the two-channel case for simplicity. The first is called SAS
(switching after success), and the second SAC (switching after collision). In both
schemes, a switching probability is assigned to each backoff stage. Under SAS (resp.
SAC), a node switches to the other channel with probability α
(k)
ℓ upon a successful
transmission (resp. collision) if it is at the ℓ-th backoff stage on channel k when this
success (resp. collision) occurs. In addition, in SAC, after switching to the other
channel, a node does not reset its backoff stage; instead, it continues the exponential
backoff due to the last collision. Note that SAS can be used to implement any
arbitrary packet assignment distribution (and thus load distribution), which is a useful
feature when we proceed to the implementation under asymmetric channels. This is
because with the assumption of nonpreemptiveness of the policy, i.e., A7, switching
after each successful transmission is equivalent to assigning packets.
These two schemes heuristically implement the equi-occupancy policy in the fol-
lowing sense, when the switching probability profiles are identical in all channels and
the channels are symmetric. Consider the two-dimensional Markov chains for a two-
channel system in the form of Bianchi’s model [45], where each state in one channel
has a mirror state in the other. Since for both SAS and SAC, the corresponding
Markov chain is irreducible with a finite number of states, using the argument of
symmetry, the symmetric solution is the unique stationary distribution that reflects
equi-occupancy. It should be noted however that neither of the above is a perfect so-
lution and the key may be a proper combination of the two. The problem with SAS
is that it can result in empty channels (the node that succeeded in the transmission
happens to be the only node in that channel). When this happens nodes can tend
to cluster in the non-empty channel for significant periods of time due to collision
and backoff, while our mean field Markov analysis implicitly assumes no channels are
empty for long. On the other hand, the problem with SAC (SAC rarely results in
empty channels and avoids clustering in one channel) is that it interrupts the service
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process of a packet in a given channel, thus violating the nonpreemptive assumption
about the policy.
Compared to the decentralized implementation in the slotted Aloha simplification,
we note both schemes similarly use the congestion level as payoff of the residing
channel, though in a vague way using the backoff stage as an indicator, which agrees
with our conjecture then. Also, both schemes rely solely on the real-time information
of the residing channel, conceptually a further reduced version of the simple learning
algorithm we presented in Chapter IV. Furthermore, SAC is consistent with our
setup on the update opportunities, where a channel with more nodes statistically has
a greater number of updates, and SAS has a bounded number of updates in each
slot. Meanwhile, we are also aware of discrepancies between the two heuristics and
the implementation in Chapter IV. The number of updates in a slot scales w.r.t. the
population size in SAC and the number of updates in a channel is roughly inversely
proportional to the local population size in SAS.
It is also worth noting that when SAS or SAC implements the equi-occupancy
policy, or more generally known occupancy (or packet assignment) distributions, our
model and assumptions admit an M/M/1 type of delay analysis. For instance, the
average packet delay of a stable node i is given by ρi
λi(1−ρi)
and can be numerically
evaluated through the stability equations.
5.6.3 Practical Implementation of Throughput Optimal Unbiased Poli-
cies: Asymmetric Channels
We next proceed to asymmetric channels and examine how these two heuristics
perform in this setting, and in doing so also empirically examine when the stability
region is maximized. In particular, we focus on the performance of a policy when
the majority of the nodes have similar arrival rates, and we examine the advantage
of load balancing in improving stability. In our experiment, we fix 10 nodes with an
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arrival rate 0.5Mbps that creates a mean-field background in a two-channel network
while inspecting the stability region of another two nodes, which is the intersection
of the aggregate stability region with the plane of these two nodes’ arrival rates. All
nodes use the same policy in a single experiment.
In Figure 5.7, we plot the empirical boundary of stability regions under different
packet assignment distributions (implemented using SAS). As shown, policies with
packet assignment ratio close to the bandwidth ratio indeed result in larger stability
regions. However, while it seems safe to claim that properly balancing active time
among channels according to their bandwidths improves the system performance, it
remains unknown whether an exact match in load assignment is the optimal policy
due to the nonlinearity of slot length in each channel w.r.t. active nodes. In addition,
in practice we may not even know the effective bandwidth of each channel when
channel conditions are imperfect.
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Figure 5.7: The intersection of simulated stability region with the plane of arrival
rates of the two nodes under inspection.
It is therefore highly desirable to have an adaptive mechanism that dynamically
adjusts the load distribution in practical implementation. Below we show that SAC
to a large extent can achieve this goal, with the reason being that collision rate reflects
the contention level and bandwidth information. Figure 5.7 also shows the empirical
stability region obtained using SAC with a switching probability at the ℓ-th backoff
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stage α
(k)
ℓ =
ℓ
m
for all k, where m is the maximum backoff stage. SAC is clearly not
optimal, but it maintains good performance under different bandwidth ratios.
We further highlight the adaptiveness of SAC in comparison to SAS. Assume that
the active node population in each channel is the same and static, given then the
same period of time, faster channels experience more transmission successes than
slower ones. Therefore, if a SAS-like switching policy is adopted for a relatively
congested network, nodes would cluster in the slower channels and the throughput
performance degrades significantly. However, if the congestion is due to bandwidth
asymmetry, then this is reflected in the collision rate of transmission, which in turns
triggers channel reallocation under SAC. We illustrate this point using the follow-
ing experiment. Consider a two-channel system with strongly asymmetric channels,
where the bandwidth of channel 1 (2) is 1Mbps (10Mbps). The system consists of
60 nodes each with an arrival rate 0.1Mbps, and this aggregate arrival rate (6Mbps)
is slightly below the empirical saturation throughput under this setting. In the first
test, we compare the resulting distribution of number of nodes on channel 1 between
SAC and SAS with the switching probability α
(k)
ℓ = 0.5 for all stages in both channels,
and we repeat the inspection with the switching probability α
(k)
ℓ =
ℓ
m
at stage ℓ in
the second test; the duration of simulation is 180 seconds. The switching probability
profile in the first test can be regarded as a blind configuration, while the second
profile can be taken as an adaptive configuration that partially incorporates collision
history into switching decisions. In Figure 5.8, we plot the histograms of the number
of nodes on channel 1, as well as the empirical throughput obtained. As can be seen,
the blindly configured SAS drives nodes to cluster in the slower channel, while SAC
avoids this problem. Interestingly, SAS has comparable performance as SAC if we
adjust the switching probabilities as we did in the second test, which reflects the con-
gestion level in the residing channel, and both distributions “match” the bandwidth
ratio. It suggests that while SAS is not as adaptive as SAC, it remains a valid alter-
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native implementation and could achieve comparable performance when configured
appropriately, as did above.
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Figure 5.8: Histogram of node population in the slower channel: (a) SAC ((b) SAS)
with αℓ = 0.5; (c) SAC ((d) SAS) with αℓ =
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m
.
5.6.4 Fairness under Throughput Optimal Policies
The general philosophy of SAS is that a node immediately vacates a channel in
which it just had a success so other nodes can have a chance, while that of SAC is to
keep using that channel until it gets inferior. While at opposite ends of the spectrum,
this altruism and egoism respectively achieves the same system level fairness when
universally adopted by all nodes in the network due to symmetry3.
To illustrate further, consider a possibly asymmetric two-channel system with a
mixture of saturated and unsaturated nodes, and consider two notions of fairness.
3Strategic behavior could lead to unfair advantage if users deviate from the preset rule. Consider
for instance a two-channel example where all but one node adopt SAS thus clustering in an inferior
channel, while one node persists in the good channel using SAC.
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Under the first notion, fairness is measured by the individual throughput achieved by
a node, compared to other similarly loaded nodes. For stable nodes, their through-
put is simply their arrival rates. For saturated nodes, their attempt rates become
essentially the same after queues have built up. This together with the fact that
the implementation of SAS and SAC are not user-specific suggests the individual
throughput is identical among saturated nodes.
Under the second notion, we measure fairness by the portion of a user’s packets
served in the better channel. Recall that SAS can be used to implement any arbitrary
packet assignment distribution by tuning the conditional switching probabilities at
each backoff stage after a successful transmission. For instance, if the switching
probabilities are set to 1 in the worse channel at all stages while 1/2 in the better
one, each node should then have on average 2/3 of its packets served in the better
channel in the long term. This is independent of the arrival process or attempt rate
of any node, and hence this type of fairness is also achieved.
5.7 Signal Quality plus Congestion Level in Channel Selec-
tion
Our primary intention is to study how congestion should be factored into switch-
ing decisions in a multi-channel system, and have so far assumed a perfect channel
condition in terms of signal quality. In this section we consider the impact of consid-
ering congestion in addition to signal quality in making channel switching decisions.
Below we first consider extending the current model to include packet loss due to
poor channel/signal quality, and then empirically study how SAS and SAC perform
under imperfect channel conditions compared to a switching policy that solely relies
on signal quality estimates.
Different signal quality can be captured by a probability of packet failure loss for
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each transmission attempt, independent from losses due to collision, denoted by π(k)
for channel k. We consider two cases depending on whether we shall assume that
a node can distinguish a collision loss from a packet failure loss due to poor signal
quality. In the first case when a node is able to distinguish the two, then Automatic
Repeat reQuest (ARQ) can be applied upon a failed transmission within the same
channel reservation (i.e., a node does not release the channel upon a packet failure
but will continue to retransmit). For simplicity we shall assume there is no re-try
limit, and thus the introduction of packet failure losses only affects the duration of
a data session after a successful channel reservation, which was denoted by T
(k)
s in
the origin model for a successful transmission. This effectively leads to asymmetric
channels even if they have the same amount of bandwidth. Since the duration of a
single data session is generally much greater than the channel coherence time, we shall
assume that packet failures occur independently in each re-transmission attempt with
probability π(k). The number of retransmissions then follows a geometric distribution,
and the expected duration of a data session after a successful reservation of channel
k is given by
T
(k)
q
1−π(k)
+ T
(k)
s , where T
(k)
q is the duration of a transmission that resulted
in packet failure.
In the second case, when a node is not able to distinguish a packet failure loss
from collision, it will simply regard each unsuccessful transmission attempt as be-
ing involved in a collision. As a result the conditional collision probability given a
transmission attempt in Σg(b) is updated as
p
(k)
i = 1− (1− π(k))
∏
j 6=i
(1− τ (k)j ).
In both cases, the original model can be extended to compute the corresponding
stability regions.
We now numerically compare the proposed congestion-aware switching algorithm
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Figure 5.9: Congestion-based vs. signal-based: stability region.
to a method that uses only signal quality. Consider three channels with equal band-
width (a third of 11Mbps) but different signal qualities modeled as packet loss prob-
abilities for a given transmission attempt (0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 for the three channels,
respectively). Assume nodes can tell collision loss from failure loss. We fix 20 nodes
each with an arrival rate 0.1Mbps that creates a mean-field background as in the
previous section, while tuning the arrival rates of two additional nodes. We then
inspect the stability region projected onto the plane where these two nodes’ arrival
rates reside.
In one scenario, all nodes use SAC together with ARQ within each data session
until success. In the other scenario, all nodes use a signal-based (SB) switching
method that essentially performs an online estimate of the packet failure loss rate in
each channel, by tracking the total number of successful transmissions and the total
number of transmission attempts within each data session (after successful channel
reservation), and switches to (or remains in) the channel with the lowest current
estimate upon each successful packet transmission. In the long run one expects nodes
to cluster in the best channel even while it gets more congested. This is indeed
observed in our simulation; the resulting stability regions are depicted in Figure 5.94.
We also report the average number of nodes in each channel at near-saturated points
4Note that only a limited number of boundary points are identified to sketch the stability regions;
the connecting lines are hence not necessarily the exact boundary.
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during a simulation of 30 seconds in Table 5.1, which confirms our intuition.
Table 5.1: Congestion-based vs. signal-based: node distribution.
Channel 1 2 3
Node
Distr’n
SAC 6.69 7.21 8.10 (λ1, λ2) = (1, 1)
SB 14.22 5.30 2.48 (λ1, λ2) = (.6, .6)
In this study we have used a rather simple signal-based algorithm. Nevertheless it
validates our observation that considering only signal quality can be a very detrimental
thing to do when there is significant congestion in the system.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Summary of Main Contributions
In this dissertation, we studied channel switching decision problems in multi-
channel wireless networks, where channel switching is viewed as a defense strategy
against a jamming attacker in adversarial environment, and as a spectrum resource
allocation technique in multi-user systems. In addition to the application of classic
decision and optimization theory in our solution framework, we aimed to formulate
and address these problems from a learning perspective, which in other words is on
the adaptive and evolving responses of individuals based on limited but accumulating
information in repeated interaction. In the context of system engineering, interacting
players are typically given by non-strategic and programmable devices. Hence, unlike
the study of learning theory in the economic or the psychological discipline, the
justification of rationality on the individual choice of learning algorithms, which is
in essence the information fusion and strategy update law, can be much relaxed in
system engineering, which offers a new approach to decentralized implementations of
optimal control.
In our first part of study, we presented two problems in Chapter II and III on using
channel hopping as jamming defense. We investigated the optimal responses from the
user with respect to different levels of knowledge on the adversary and criteria of op-
91
timality. The attacker-user model we used is also often known as the pursuit-evasion
model in the literature, and the framework and the results we developed in this part
is applicable to two-player interaction in problems in this general context. When the
interference to a given user is not malicious but rather the results of contention among
a group of legitimate users, channelization can become an effective resource sharing
mechanism other than defense strategy. From this point of view, we studied the de-
centralized channel switching of users for throughput enhancement in random access
systems. Our main focus was to develop a theory on throughput optimal switching
strategies in the industrial standard 802.11 DCF scheme (Chapter V), and we started
from an Aloha simplification with homogeneous users (Chapter IV), which allowed
an elegant learning formulation and provided plentiful insights for the technically
more complex DCF. As our later study on DCF showed, the learning technique does
provide a guideline to implementing decentralized optimal control.
6.2 Future Work
Future work remains in the following areas.
• Rendezvous problem in networks. Seeking rendezvous between a pair of trans-
mitter and receiver in a multi-channel system can be a critical issue in oppor-
tunistic access schemes, when a control channel or centralized message exchange
is infeasible. The formulation we had for the jamming defense problem can be
naturally extended to the rendezvous problem. However, the jamming defense
problem has the particular zero-sum nature, and this was the key to enable
basic convergence of learning to establish optimality results. In contrast, play-
ers in the rendezvous problem seek to coordinate, and the underlying game is
general-sum. While the action pairs in pure Nash equilibria are socially opti-
mal, no-regret learning algorithms are no longer guaranteed to converge to such
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profiles of actions. It is therefore an open question if any general or ad hoc
decision-making/learning protocol can be devised.
• Channel allocation in multihop networks. The problems we have studied so
far assume the one-hop or start-shaped topology. While this simple type of
networks characterizes a number of application scenarios, specifically for net-
works with infrastructure, multihop networks have been proposed and widely
studied as an option for infrastructure-free wireless networks. With channel-
ization, the spatial reuse and diversity can be further enhanced in multi-hop
networks and we may expect a considerable performance boost with intelligent
and dynamic spectrum sharing, namely transmission scheduling and channel
allocation. Throughput optimal transmission scheduling in multihop random
access networks has been extensively studied in the literature based on Lya-
punov analysis. One step beyond the study we presented in Chapter IV and
V could be a revisit of the scheduling problem with the additional degree of
freedom in channel allocation. Our interest lies in the nature of the centralized
solution as well as practical decentralized implementation.
93
APPENDICES
94
APPENDIX A
Supplements to Chapter II
Proof of Theorem II.7
Proof. Define ∆ij(t) := Gi(t)−Gj(t). Then,
αk(t) =
1∑m
j=1 a
∆jk(t−1)
,
and
rπ(t) =
∑
j 6=π(t) a
∆jπ(t)(t−1)
1 +
∑
j 6=π(t) a
∆jπ(t)(t−1)
.
Let K(t) = argmink∈[K]Gk(t), and define T = {t ≤ T : maxk/∈K(t)∆k,j(t) ≥ 2, j ∈
K(t)}. Suppose that T 6= ∅, and let t0 = min T . Then, either (C1) there exists some
time t1 with t0 < t1 ≤ T when some location j ∈ K(t0) is selected for the first time
after t0 by the evader or (C2) any location j ∈ K(t0) is never selected by the horizon
T .
Consider first the case (C1). Without loss of generality, assume that the location
selected at t1 − 1 is 2 and 1 is chosen at t1. Let ∆ij(t1 − 1) = dij . Then,
• ∆ij(t1) = ∆ij(t1 + 1) = dij for all i, j ≥ 3;
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• ∆1j(t1) = d1j for all j ≥ 3, ∆12(t1) = d12−1, ∆1j(t1+1) = d1j +1 for all j ≥ 3,
and ∆12(t1) = d12;
• ∆2j(t1) = d2j + 1 for all j 6= 2, ∆2j(t1 + 1) = d2j + 1 for all j ≥ 3, and
∆21(t1 + 1) = d21.
Consider now a change of policy by selecting location 1 at t1− 1 and location 2 at t1.
Denote ∆ under this new policy by ∆′. Then,
• ∆′ij(t1) = ∆′ij(t1 + 1) = dij for all i, j ≥ 3.
• ∆′1j(t1) = d1j + 1 for all j ≥ 2, ∆′1j(t1 + 1) = d1j + 1 for all j ≥ 3, and
∆′12(t1) = d12;
• ∆′2j(t1) = d2j for all j ≥ 3, ∆′21(t1) = d21−1, ∆′2j(t1+1) = d2j +1 for all j ≥ 3,
and ∆′21(t1 + 1) = d21.
Hence, this change of policy only affects the reward of the evader collected at t1 − 1
and t1. Denote by r
′ the reward under this alternative policy, and we have
r′(t1 − 1) + r′(t1)− r(t1 − 1)− r(t1)
=
∑
k≥3 a
dk1 + ad21
1 +
∑
k≥3 a
dk1 + ad21
+
∑
k≥3 a
dk2 + ad12+1
1 +
∑
k≥3 a
dk2 + ad12+1
−
∑
k≥3 a
dk2 + ad12
1 +
∑
k≥3 a
dk2 + ad12
−
∑
k≥3 a
dk1 + ad21+1
1 +
∑
k≥3 a
dk1 + ad21+1
=
1
1 + C + ad21+1
+
1
1 +D + ad12
− 1
1 + C + ad21
− 1
1 +D + ad12+1
,
where C =
∑
k≥3 a
dk1 and D =
∑
k≥3 a
dk2 . Note that C = Dad21 and d12 = −d21. Set
d = d21, and we obtain
r′(t1 − 1) + r′(t1)− r(t1 − 1)− r(t1)
=
1
1 +Dad + ad+1
+
1
1 +D + a−d
− 1
1 +Dad + ad
− 1
1 +D + a−d+1
,
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=
ad − ad+1
(1 +Dad + ad+1)(1 +Dad + ad)
+
a−d+1 − a−d
(1 +D + a−d)(1 +D + a−d+1)
=
(a2d−1 − ad−1)(a− 1)2
(1 +Dad + ad+1)(1 +Dad + ad)(1 +Dad−1 + ad−1)
> 0.
For (C2), it is clear that alternatively selecting location 1 at T results in a higher
reward.
Therefore, the optimal policy would never allow the difference between the times
that any two locations are selected to be greater than 2. In other word, the opti-
mal policy always selects the most under-utilized location. When there are multiple
locations with the same lowest number of times of the evader’s presence, the evader
would be indifferent in selecting any location between/among them, since locations
are symmetric (and the reward is only related to the the relative difference between
the numbers of location usage).
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APPENDIX B
Supplements to Chapter III
Proof of Lemma III.12
Proof. Assume that there exist s and t such that s ∈ St and u∗0(s, t) = 1. Then, there
exists σ and τ such that σ ∈ Sτ , t ≤ τ < T , u∗0(σ, τ) = 1 and u∗0(s′, t′) = 0 for all
s′ ∈ St′ for all t′ > τ ; otherwise, u∗0(s′′, T ) = 1 for some s′′ ∈ ST , which is clearly not
an equilibrium strategy for the attacker. If τ = T − 1, then
U∗T−1(σ) = U
∗
T (fT−1(σ, 0))
=
n∑
i=1
qiw
∗
i (fT−1(σ, 0), T )ci + ǫ(fT−1(σ, 0)) ≤ v + ǫmax.
Consider an alternative strategy u˜ such that u˜ = u∗ except that u˜i(σ, T − 1) = qi.
Then,
U˜T−1(σ) :=
n∑
i=1
qi(w
∗
i (σ, T − 1)ci + U∗T (fT−1(σ, i))) = v +
n∑
i=1
qiU
∗
T (fT−1(σ, i)).
Let k ∈ [n] be such that fT−1(σ, k) ∈ ST . Then U˜T−1(σ) ≥ v + qkv ≥ v + qminv.
Hence U˜T−1(σ) > U
∗
T−1(σ), which contradicts the fact that u
∗ is a SPE strategy.
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U
(k)
τ+k(h
σ
τ+k) =
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ
(k), τ + k)U
(k)
τ+k+1
(
〈hστ+k, i, 0, fτ+k(σ(k), 0)〉
)
(B.1)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ
(k), τ + k) ·
n∑
ℓ=1
n∑
j=1
w∗ℓ (fτ+k(σ
(k), 0), τ + k + 1)qj·
· U (k)τ+k+2
(
〈hστ+k, i, 0, fτ+k(σ, 0), l, j, fτ+k+1(fτ+k(σ(k), 0), j)〉
)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ
(k), τ + k)
n∑
j=1
qjVτ+k+2(fτ+k+1(fτ+k(σ
(k), 0), j)),
U
(k+1)
τ+k (h
σ
τ+k) =
n∑
i=1
qiw
∗
i (σ
(k), τ + k)ci+
+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w∗i (σ
(k), τ + k)qjU
(k+1)
τ+k+1
(
〈hστ+k, i, j, fτ+k(σ(k), j)〉
)
(B.2)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ
(k), τ + k)
n∑
j=1
qj
n∑
ℓ=1
w∗ℓ (fτ+k(σ
(k), j), τ + k + 1)·
· U (k+1)τ+k+2
(
〈hστ+k, i, j, fτ+k(σ(k), j), l, 0, fτ+k+1(fτ+k(σ(k), j), 0)〉
)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ
(k), τ + k)
n∑
j=1
qj
n∑
ℓ=1
w∗(fτ+k+1(σ
(k), 0), τ + k + 1)·
· U (k+1)τ+k+2
(
〈hστ+k, i, j, fτ+k(σ(k), j), l, 0, fτ+k+1(fτ+k(σ(k), 0), j)〉
)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ
(k), τ + k)
n∑
j=1
qjVτ+k+2(fτ+k+1(fτ+k(σ
(k), 0), j)) = U
(k)
τ+k(h
σ
τ+k).
Thus, τ < T − 1. Now consider a particular subgame with the full label hστ such
that sτ = σ. We shall alternate u
∗ and construct inductively a sequence of strategies
that only differ from u∗ within this subgame. These alternative strategies will be in
G0−G˜0, i.e., it can depend on the past actions instead of only the resource level, and
we shall show that the last strategy of this sequence strictly improves the payoff of the
attacker. To make the dependency on the full history explicit, we use the notation
Ut(w, u, ht) := E
{
T∑
r=t
w(hr)
⊤Mu(hr) + ǫ(sT )
∣∣∣∣ ht
}
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for the value of the subgame labeled by ht, and denote u(ht) as the strategy of the
attacker at the node ht of the game tree. To simplify our notation, since w
∗ ∈ G† ⊆ G˜,
we shall keep write w∗(s, t) as the strategy of the user at some node ht such that st = s.
Note that
U∗τ (h
σ
τ ) := Uτ (w
∗, u∗, hστ )
=
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ, τ)U
∗
τ+1
(
〈hστ , i, 0, fτ(σ, 0)〉
)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ, τ)
n∑
ℓ=1
n∑
j=1
w∗ℓ (fτ (σ, 0), τ + 1)qj ·
· U∗τ+2
(
〈hστ , i, 0, fτ (σ, 0), l, j, fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j)〉
)
.
and U∗τ+2
(〈hστ , i, 0, fτ(σ, 0), l, j, fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j)〉) only depends on fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j) since
w∗, u∗ ∈ G˜τ+2. Denote then this number by Vτ+2(fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j)). Hence,
U∗τ (h
σ
τ ) = v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ, τ)
n∑
j=1
qjVτ+2(fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j)).
Let i1 and j1 be such that i1 ∈ supp(w∗(σ, τ)) and fτ (σ, j1) ∈ Sτ+1, where j1
exists due to our assumption. Consider an alternative strategy u(1) such that u(1) = u∗
except that u
(1)
i (h
σ
τ ) = qi for all i ∈ [n] and u(1)0 (〈hστ , i, j, fτ (σ, j)〉) = 1 for all i, j ∈ [n].
Then,
U (1)τ (h
σ
τ ) := Uτ (w
∗, u(1), hστ )
=
n∑
i=1
qiw
∗
i (σ, τ)ci +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w∗i (σ, τ)qjU
(1)
τ+1
(
〈hστ , i, j, fτ (σ, j)〉
)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ, τ)
n∑
j=1
qjU
(1)
τ+1
(
〈hστ , i, j, fτ (σ, j)〉
)
(B.3)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ, τ)
n∑
j=1
qj
n∑
ℓ=1
w∗ℓ (fτ (σ, j), τ + 1)·
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· U (1)τ+2
(
〈hστ , i, j, fτ (σ, j), l, 0, fτ+1(fτ (σ, j), 0)〉
)
= v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ, τ)
n∑
j=1
qj
n∑
ℓ=1
w∗ℓ (fτ (σ, j), τ + 1)·
· U (1)τ+2
(
〈hστ , i, j, fτ (σ, j), l, 0, fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j)〉
)
U
(1)
τ+2
(〈hστ , i, j, fτ (σ, j), l, 0, fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j)〉) only depends on fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j) and is
equal to Vτ+2(fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j)) by noting that u
(1) ∈ G˜τ+2 and u(1) = u∗ at any node
ht with t ≥ τ + 2 by construction, so we have
U (1)τ (h
σ
τ ) = v +
n∑
i=1
w∗i (σ, τ)
n∑
j=1
qjVτ+2(fτ+1(fτ (σ, 0), j)) = U
∗
τ (h
σ
τ ),
i.e., u(1) does not change the value of the subgame labeled by hστ , and also by (B.3), for
each i ∈ supp(w∗(σ, τ)), the subgame labeled by 〈hστ , i, j, fτ (σ, j)〉 can be reached with
positive probability under the strategy w∗ and u(1), and hence U
(1)
τ+1
(〈hστ , i, j, fτ (σ, j)〉)
has a positive weight in the evaluation of U
(1)
τ (hστ ) as well U
∗
τ (h
σ
τ ) for all i ∈ [n]. Let
fτ,τ+k−1(σ, j1, . . . , jk) := fτ+k−1(fτ,τ+k−2(σ, j1, . . . , jk−1), jk),
where fτ,τ (σ, j1) := fτ (σ, j1), and fτ,τ−1(σ) := σ, and let σ
(k) := fτ,τ+k−1(σ, j1, . . . , jk).
That is, σ(k) is the resource level at τ + k when the resource level at τ is σ and
the actions taken by the attacker from τ to τ + k − 1 are given by j1, j2, . . . , jk.
Also, let hστ+k := 〈hστ+k−1, ik, jk, σ(k)〉, where ir and jr are chosen such that ir ∈
supp(w∗(σ(r−1), τ + r− 1)) and σ(r) ∈ Sτ+r for all r = 1, 2, . . . , k− 1, which is feasible
by our assumption.
Suppose that we have constructed a sequence of strategies u(r) based on u(r−1) for
r = 1, 2, . . . , k, such that u(r) = u(r−1) except that in the subgame labeled by hστ+r−1
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we set u
(r)
i (h
σ
τ+r−1) = qi for all i ∈ [n] and
u
(r)
0 (〈hστ+r−1, i, j, fτ+r−1(σ(r−1), j)〉) = 1
for all i, j ∈ [n], which implies that u(r) ∈ G˜τ+r+1 and u(r) = u(r−1) at all nodes ht
with t ≥ τ + r+ 1. Suppose the constructed strategies satisfy that U (r)τ+r−1(hστ+r−1) =
U
(r−1)
τ+r−1(h
σ
τ+r−1) where U
(r)
τ+r−1(h
σ
τ+r−1) := Uτ+r−1(w
∗, u(r), hστ+r−1) and U
(0)
τ := U∗τ for
all r, which implies U
(k)
τ (hστ ) = U
∗
τ (h
σ
τ ). Also, suppose each subgame labeled by h
σ
τ+r
can be reached with positive probability under w∗ and u(r) for all r = 1, 2, . . . , k,
which implies that U
(k)
τ+k(h
σ
τ+k) has a positive weight in in the evaluation of U
(k)
τ (hστ ).
Consider then a strategy u(k+1) such that u(k+1) = u(k) except that in the subgame
labeled by hστ+k we set u
(k+1)
i (h
σ
τ+k) = qi for all i ∈ [n] and
u
(k+1)
0 (〈hστ+k, i, j, fτ+k(σ(τ+k))〉) = 1
for all i, j ∈ [n]. Then, u(k+1) ∈ G˜τ+k+2 and u(k+1) = u(k) at all nodes ht with
t ≥ τ + k + 2. Consequently, we have (B.1), where Vτ+k+2(fτ+k+1(fτ+k(σ(k), 0), j))
is some number that only depends on fτ+k+1(fτ+k(σ
(k), 0), j); on the other hand, we
have (B.2). Hence, U
(k)
τ (hστ ) = U
∗
τ (h
σ
τ ). Also, by (B.2), U
(k+1)
τ+k+1(h
σ
τ+k+1) has a positive
weight in in the evaluation of U
(k)
τ (hστ ), which completes our induction.
This inductive construction can proceed until τ + k = T − 1, and we have
u
(T−1−τ)
0 (h
σ
T−1) = 1 where σ
T−1−τ ∈ ST−1. However, by further modifying u(T−1−τ)
as shown in the beginning of this proof, we can strictly improve U
(T−1−τ)
T−1 (h
σ
T−1), thus
increasing U
(T−1−τ)
τ (hστ ) so as to be greater than U
∗
τ (h
σ
τ ), which is a contradiction to
the fact that u∗ is a SPE strategy.
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APPENDIX C
Supplements to Chapter V
Proof of ρ ≥ ρˆ
Proof. We first define the following stochastic processes generated by the queueing
process at node i. Let Ti,Q(t) (resp. Ti,Q(t)) be the total length of real time periods
up to time t that the queue at node i is non-empty (resp. empty) (or i is busy (resp.
(idle)). Let Ni,Q(t) (resp. Ni,Q(t)) be the total number of slots up to time t that the
queue at node i is non-empty (resp. empty) at the beginning of slots. These processes
are well-defined on the same sample space. Conditional on that the queue is stable,
due to ergodicity, ρi and ρˆi can then be expressed respectively as
ρi = lim
t→∞
Ti,Q(t)
t
= lim
t→∞
Ti,Q(t)
Ti,Q(t) + Ti,Q(t)
,
and
ρˆi = lim
t→∞
Ni,Q(t)
Ni,Q(t) +Ni,Q(t)
,
almost surely. Let ∆i(t) be the total time fragments of busy periods in idle slots of
node i up to time t, and let Si,Q(k) (Si,Q(k)) be the length of the k-th busy (resp.
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idle) slot. Quantities described above are illustrated in Figure C.1. Then, we have
Ti,Q(t)−∆i(t) =
Ni,Q(t)∑
k=1
Si,Q(k),
and
t =
Ni,Q(t)∑
k=1
Si,Q(k) +
N
i,Q
(t)∑
k=1
Si,Q(k).
Therefore,
ρi ≥ lim
t→∞
Ti,Q(t)−∆i(t)
t
= lim
t→∞
∑Ni,Q(t)
k=1 Si,Q(k)∑Ni,Q(t)
k=1 Si,Q(k) +
∑N
i,Q
(t)
k=1 Si,Q(k)
= lim
t→∞
[∑Ni,Q(t)
k=1 Si,Q(k)
Ni,Q(t)
Ni,Q(t)
/(∑Ni,Q(t)
k=1 Si,Q(k)
Ni,Q(t)
Ni,Q(t)+
+
∑N
i,Q
(t)
k=1 Si,Q(k)
Ni,Q(t)
Ni,Q(t)
)]
,
almost surely. Let ESi,Q and ESi,Q be the conditional average lengths of an arbitrary
slot, given that the queue at node i is non-empty or empty at the beginning of
slot, respectively. We claim that ESi,Q > ESi,Q. Note also that Ni,Q(t) → ∞ and
Ni,Q(t) → ∞ as t → ∞ conditional on stability. Consequently, following ergodicity,
we obtain
ρi ≥ lim
t→∞
Ni,Q(t)ESi,Q
Ni,Q(t)ESi,Q +Ni,Q(t)ESi,Q
≥ lim
t→∞
Ni,Q(t)
Ni,Q(t) +Ni,Q(t)
= ρˆi.
When the queue is unstable, we have ρi = ρˆi = 1. In either case, we have ρi ≥ ρˆi. It
remains to justify the claim made above, which appears in the next part.
Computation of ES{·} and Related Quantities Given an event {·}, let Pidle;{·},
Psucc;{·} and Pcoll;{·} be the conditional probabilities that a slot is idle, that the trans-
mission attempt in the slot is a success, and that the attempt results in a collision,
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Figure C.1: Slotted time dynamics.
respectively. Notice that Pcoll;{·} = 1− Pidle;{·} − Psucc;{·}. Therefore,
ES{·} = σ · Pidle;{·} + Ts · Psucc;{·} + Tc · Pcoll;{·}.
where σ, Ts and Tc are the lengths of an empty system slot, a successful transmission,
and a collision, respectively. Define then by τi,Q the conditional probability that node
i transmits in an arbitrary slot, given its queue is non-empty at the beginning of this
slot, and hence we have τi,Q =
1
W i
. Consequently,
Pidle;i,Q =
∏
j 6=i
(1− τj),
Psucc;i,Q =
∑
j 6=i
τj
∏
l 6=i,j
(1− τℓ),
Pidle;i,Q = (1− τi,Q)
∏
j 6=i
(1− τj),
Psucc;i,Q =
∑
ℓ
τ˜ℓ
∏
j 6=l
(1− τ˜ℓ),
where τ˜j = τi,Q1j=i + τj1j 6=i. Since Pidle;i,Q < Pidle;i,Q and σ < min{Ts, Tc}, we have
ESi,Q > ESi,Q and they are both finite. Explicit expressions for other variations of
ES{·} can be derived in a similar way, and are thus omitted.
Approximation of ρˆi Due to the analytical intractability of ∆i(t), we are interested
in proper approximations of ρˆi that can lead to good estimate of Λ; a good estimate
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in the context of stability study means a tight underestimation. Recall that ρˆi ≤ ρi
and equality holds if and only if ρi = 1 or ρi = 0; therefore by replacing ρˆi by ρi in
Σ(c), solutions to the resulting system of equations form an underestimation of Λ but
accurate when ρi = 1 or 0 for all i. Moreover, when 0 < ρˆi < 1, we have
ρˆi = lim
t→∞
Ti,Q(t)−∆i(t)
Sav
i,Q
(t)
Ti,Q(t)−∆i(t)
Sav
i,Q
(t)
+
T
i,Q
(t)+∆i(t)
Sav
i,Q
(t)
≤ lim
t→∞
Ti,Q(t)
Ti,Q(t)+Ti,Q(t)
Sav
i,Q
(t)
Ti,Q(t)
Ti,Q(t)+Ti,Q(t)
Sav
i,Q
(t) +
T
i,Q
(ω,t)
Ti,Q(t)+Ti,Q(t)
Savi,Q(t)
=
ρiESi,Q
ρiESi,Q + (1− ρi)ESi,Q
≤ ρi,
where
Savi,Q(t) =
1
Ni,Q(t)
Ni,Q(t)∑
k=1
Si,Q(k)
and defining
ˆˆρi =
ρiESi,Q
ρiESi,Q + (1− ρi)ESi,Q
,
we have ρˆi ≤ ˆˆρi ≤ ρi. Hence, substituting ρˆi with ˆˆρi in Σ(c), we can obtain a tighter
underestimation of Λ than with ρi, thus trading off computational complexity for
higher accuracy. Empirical results suggest that ˆˆρ is sufficiently close to ρˆ, and we use
ˆˆρ as ρˆ throughout our computation.
Proof of Proposition V.8 Substituting Σ˜(b) in (a), we obtain
τi =
2λi
P (W + 1)
[
W − 1
2
(
σ + T
∑
j 6=i
τj
)
+ T
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
τj
)]
=
2λi
P (W + 1)
[
W + 1
2
T
∑
j 6=i
τj +
W − 1
2
σ + T
]
=
λiT
P
∑
j 6=i
τj +
λi((W − 1)σ + 2T )
P (W + 1)
,
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which can be rewritten as
τi =
(λiT
P
∑
j
τj +
λi((W − 1)σ + 2T )
P (W + 1)
)/(
1 +
λiT
P
)
.
Therefore, let y =
∑
j τj , γ
1
i =
λiT
P
/(
1 + λiT
P
)
and γ2i =
λi((W−1)σ+2T )
P (W+1)
/(
1 + λiT
P
)
,
and we have τi = γ
1
i y + γ
2
i . Then, Σ˜ is equivalent to
Σ˜ :

τi = γ
1
i y + γ
2
i (a
′)
y =
∑
i
(
γ1i y + γ
2
i
)
(b′)
which admits only one solution, namely
τi =
γ1i
∑
j γ
2
j
1−∑i γ1j + γ2i .
Proof of Theorem V.19
Proof. Using Σ˜g
U
(a), we can rewrite Σ˜g
U
(b) as follows:
ρi =
λi
P
∑
k∈[K]
{
q(k)
[
W − 1
2
(
σ + T
∑
j 6=i
τ
(k)
j
)
+ T
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
τ
(k)
j
)]}
= θ1i
∑
k∈[K]
(
q(k)
∑
j 6=i
τ
(k)
j
)
+ θ2i
= θ1i
∑
k∈[K]
φi(q
(k); ρj , j 6= i) + θ2i ,
where θ1i =
λi(W+1)T
2P
, θ2i =
λi(W−1)σ+2T
2P
, and φi(q
(k); ρj , j 6= i) = q(k)
∑
j 6=i τ
(k)
j =∑
j 6=i αj
[
q(k)
]2
with αj =
2ρj
W+1
> 0 for all j. Notice that φi(q
(k); ρj, j 6= i) is a convex
function of q(k) given any fixed ρj where j 6= i, and it is also an increasing function
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of ρj ’s given any fixed q
(k). We then have
ρi = θ
1
i
∑
k∈[K]
φi(q
(k)) + θ2i
= θ1i ·K
∑
k∈[K]
(
1
K
φi(q
(k))
)
+ θ2i
≥ θ1i ·Kφi
∑
k∈[K]
(
1
K
q(k)
) + θ2i
= θ1i ·Kφi
(
1
K
)
+ θ2i ,
where the equality holds when q
(k)
i =
1
K
. Therefore, when switching to the equi-
occupancy policy from any arbitrary unbiased policy, the utilization factor of each
node is always non-increasing. Hence, we conclude that the equi-occupancy scheduling
policy is throughput optimal in GU .
Specifications of the implementation of test bench
Total bandwidth 11 Mbps
Data packet length P 1500 Bytes
DIFS 50 µs
SIFS 10 µs
ACK packet length (in time units) 203 µs
Header length (in time units) 192 µs
Empty system slot time σ 20 µs
Propagation delay δ 1 µs
Initial backoff window size W 32
Maximum backoff stage m 5
Data rate granularity ∆λ 100 Kbps
Instability threshold constant 1%
Total simulated time Tf 10 seconds
Table C.1: Specifications of the implementation of test bench.
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APPENDIX D
Glossary of Notation
Chapter II
wt mixed strategy of the user at time t
Aw action space of the user
Mw payoff matrix of the user
Itw information state of the user at time t
gw decision policy of of the user
ut,Au,Mu, Itu, gu counterparts of the attacker
T time horizon
n number of channels, [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}
Chapter III
[n]0 {0, 1, . . . , n}
st resource level of the attacker at time t
ft resource dynamics at time t
Ft(s) attacker’s feasible action set given resource level s at time t
St set of resource levels such that all actions are feasible at time t
ht history of the game at time t
∆n space of distributions over [n]
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∆0n space of distributions over [n]
0
w decision policy of of the user
G space of policies as complete contingency plans for the user
G˜ reduced space of policies depending only on resource level
and time for the user
u,G0, G˜0 counterparts of the attacker
ck loss incurred by being attacked on channel k
Chapter IV
N number of users
K number of channels
αk time duration of a slot on channel k
λ symmetric traffic arrival rate to each user
τ symmetric transmission attempt rate of each user
x population state
xk portion of the user population on channel k
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xK)
XN finite grid space of population states with N users
∆K simplex in R
K
FN payoff function of N -user population game
F payoff function of continuous population game
ρ revision protocol
Chapter V
subscript i index of user
superscript (k) index of channel
λi data bit arrival rate at user i
Qi(t) continuous-time queueing process of user i, i.e.,
number of packets queued by user i at time t
110
Qˆi(n) embedded queueing process of user i, i.e.,
number of packets queued by user i at the beginning of slot n
W initial backoff window size
W i average backoff window size of user i
m maximum number of backoff stages
τi transmission attempt rate of user i
pi collision rate of user i
S{·} time duration of a slot given event {·}
ρi utilization factor of the continuous-time queueing process
ρˆi utilization factor of the embedded queueing process
Qni steady state occupancy distribution of user i w.r.t. n-slots
q
(k)
i steady state probability that user i is in channel k at the
beginning of an n-slot of user i
Qci steady state occupancy distribution of user i w.r.t. c-slots
qˆ
(k)
i steady state probability that user i is in channel k at the
beginning of a c-slot of channel k
Qpi steady state packet assignment distribution of user i
q˜
(k)
i steady state probability that a packet of user i is served in
channel k
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